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Abstract

What is forbidden to talk about using Chinese apps? Companies operating in China
face a complex array of regulations and are liable for content voiced using their
platforms. Previous work studying Chinese censorship uses (1) sample testing or (2)
measures content deletion; however, these techniques produce an incomplete picture
biased toward (1) the tested samples or (2) whichever topics were trending.
In this dissertation, I use reverse engineering to study the code that applications
use to determine whether to censor content. In doing so, I can provide a more
complete and unbiased view of Chinese Internet censorship. I reverse engineer applications across three Chinese industry segments: instant messaging, live streaming,
and gaming. Together this reveals over 100,000 unique blacklisted keywords from
blacklists spanning hundreds of different companies.

iv

A common assumption in Chinese censorship research is that observed censorship
is the result of a monolithic motive; however, in this dissertation, where I provide
a more complete and unbiased view of Chinese Internet censorship, I will test three
hypotheses:

(1) there is little overlap between the keyword lists used by different

companies, (2) there is no China-wide list of banned words or topics largely determining what Chinese companies censor, and (3) provincial-wide lists of banned words or
topics do not largely determine what companies censor. These hypotheses suggest
that it is largely Chinese companies that are burdened with choosing what topics to
censor.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

One way to measure which topics are forbidden on a communication platform is
for a researcher to use sample testing. In this method a researcher attempts to
communicate using the platform and then measures which communication is filtered.
When communication such as posts are publicly available, another way to measure
which topics are forbidden is to measure which posts are deleted that were previously
seen available. While these methods provide insight into censorship and its effects
on online communication, they are limited in answering the question of which topics
are forbidden because neither method provides an unbiased view of the topics the
censor wishes to suppress.
If researchers send messages over a platform to measure which are censored, then
their results will be biased toward which messages they test, which may reflect the
suspicions of the researchers. Moreover, measuring which posts are deleted is biased
toward whatever topics users are currently discussing, which may give the illusion
that popular topics are more heavily censored and that a forbidden topic that is not
discussed during the measurement period is not forbidden at all. If we wish to infer
the motives of the censor and understand the censor’s intentions, then we require a
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complete, unbiased list of any forbidden topics or blacklisted words.
In this work, I directly analyze, through reverse engineering, the rules for how
chat software is programmed to perform censorship. This approach provides a more
complete view of which topics and keywords the producers of this software intend to
suppress.
A dominant academic theory [89, 90] posits that the motive of Chinese censorship
is to suppress collective action. The implicit assumption of this theory is that there
is a monolithic motive to censorship in China exerted by the Chinese government.
In this dissertation, I will analyze over 100,000 blacklisted keywords from blacklists spanning hundreds of different companies. These lists are used to trigger censorship across three different Chinese industry segments: instant messaging, live
streaming, and games. These industry segments were chosen because they have
downloadable applications that are amenable to my reverse engineering methodology
and because these industry segments are popular, each having hundreds of millions
of users in China. Each operates under a unique Chinese regulatory environment,
and together they provide a representative view into Chinese censorship in general.
This more complete and unbiased dataset allows me to test the following three
hypotheses: (1) there is little overlap between the keyword lists used by different companies, (2) there is no China-wide list of banned words or topics
largely determining what Chinese companies censor, and (3) provincialwide lists of banned words or topics do not largely determine what companies censor. These hypotheses suggest that censorship in China is decentralized
and that the responsibility to choose what is censored is largely pushed down to
individual companies and employees.
It is important for researchers to have a correct understanding of the nature of
Internet censorship in China. In December 2016, China had over 730 million Inter-
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net users [57]. With the largest population of Internet users in the world, China in
cooperation with private companies operating in the country maintains the world’s
largest ecosystem of censorship. By understanding the nature of Internet censorship in China, users in the country may make better informed decisions because
if, for example, users are aware that individual companies have a large amount of
freedom in choosing what to censor, then they may attempt to evade censorship on
one platform by switching to another. Moreover, understanding Internet censorship
in the world’s largest country provides an important data point for understanding
the future of Internet censorship in other countries. Many countries besides China
are increasingly exerting their “Internet sovereignty,” i.e., the right of a country to
exert boundaries and information controls on the Internet. Since 2015, Russia has
collaborated with Chinese officials to design and implement their own country-wide
information controls [122], and governments in India, Turkey, and Pakistan [95] have
become increasingly reliant on private Internet companies such as Facebook to police
their platforms and remove content in accordance with those countries’ local laws.

1.1

Dissertation Overview

In Chapter 2, I review previous work related to Chinese Internet censorship. This
includes work testing for censorship on Chinese search engines, blogs, and chat platforms.
Chapters 3 through 5 present my research into Chinese censorship of realtime
chat across three different industry segments. Chapter 3 analyzes Chinese instant
messaging products. I present our results studying censorship mechanisms built into
two Chinese instant messaging products, TOM-Skype and Sina UC. We find that
each product uses thousands of keywords to trigger either censorship or surveillance.
However, we found that when we compare the keywords used in each product, there
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is little overlap [91, 59].
Chapter 4 looks at Chinese live streaming applications. In this chapter, I present
our analysis of four of the most popular live streaming apps in China. Between all
four of the apps, we found over ten thousand unique keywords that trigger censorship
in one or more of the apps. We again compare the lists used between each product,
and we find that keyword lists differ in terms of size and keyword content and that
over time keywords are added to these lists in response to different events, except for
when products have a shared parent company or have shared employees [92, 62].
Chapter 5 examines Chinese mobile games. We analyze hundreds of popular
games in China, including Chinese-developed games and international games adapted
to the Chinese market. We test a number of different hypotheses attempting to
explain the observed overlap between some lists. Among the hypotheses tested, we
found that only by looking at whether games shared a common publisher or developer
adequately predicted whether they had similar keyword lists [93].
I summarize our findings in Chapter 6. In this chapter, I also give some concluding
remarks and set out some potential directions for future research.

4

Chapter 2
Related Work

Most research on Internet censorship in China focuses on the Great Firewall of China
(GFW), its national Internet filtering system. Some of this research studies the
technical implementation details of the GFW. Zittrain et al. [143] documented the
types of filtering methods used by the GFW. Clayton et al. [56] showed that GFW
blocking based on TCP resets can be evaded if each host in the TCP connection
ignores the resets. The authors also leveraged stateful blocking behavior of the GFW
to implement a denial of service attack. Weaver et al. [133] introduced a method
for detecting forged TCP packets, including those used by the GFW to terminate
TCP connections. In 2009, Park et al. [111] found that the GFW had discontinued
keyword filtering of HTTP responses, although filtering of HTTP request URLs
remained. Winter et al. [135] determined how the GFW blocks Tor and how the
GFW discovers Tor bridge nodes. Wright [136] detected regional variations in the
GFW’s DNS poisoning behavior. Ensafi et al. [68] used a side-channel technique to
test if there exists geographic variation in the implementation of the GFW, finding
no obvious geographic patterns.
Other research studies what content is blocked by the GFW. Crandall et al. [60]
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used latent semantic analysis to uncover keywords censored by the GFW related
to sensitive topics. Xia Chu [137] tested to see which Wikipedia article URLs are
censored by the GFW, finding over 900 rules specifically targeting Wikipedia URLs
and 18 keywords targeting all URLs. In 2014, anonymous authors [22] studied the
GFW’s implementation of DNS blocking, tracing their locations and generating a
DNS blacklist of over ten thousand keywords. One ongoing project, the GreatFire
Analyzer [76], routinely probes different URLs to see which are blocked by the GFW
across time. In a work related to probing for blocked URLs, Weinberg et al. [134]
used LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) to automatically categorize into basic themes
URLs from URL probe lists. Their study revealed that probe lists were often biased
toward different topics.
Compared to research targeting the GFW, the number of studies on surveillance
and censorship performed by private Chinese companies is limited. The microblogging service, Sina Weibo, has been the focus of a number of studies that show the
dynamic nature of content filtering on the platform. Bamman, et al. [28] conducted
statistical analysis of deleted Weibo posts and found that posts with sensitive words
and from certain geographic locations (e.g., Tibet and Qinghai) have a higher deletion rate. Zhu, et al. [142] measured censorship on Weibo and found that retroactive
post deletions occur within minutes and the censors use a variety of automated tools.
The University of Hong Kong has developed WeiboScope, a data collection and visualizations system for tracking censorship on Weibo [12]. Fu et al. [73] use this system
to show that real name registration policies on Weibo may have caused some users
to self-censor. Ng [106] identified numerous ways that a Weibo message could be
censored or held in review both before and after being posted, confirming the usage
of both automated and manual review processes.
Tencent’s WeChat, a popular chat and blogging platform in China, has also been
the focus of many studies. Ng [107] analyzed deleted blog posts in WeChat and found
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that a large number of the deleted posts were related to rumors, even when the topic
of the rumors seemed apolitical. Ruan et al. [115] used sample testing to measure
WeChat censorship over chat and found that WeChat only enables chat censorship
for accounts registered to phone numbers. They also found that group chat was more
heavily censored than one to one chat, hypothesizing that this was because messages
in group chat reached larger audiences. A follow-up work [116] studying censorship
related to an event in China known as the “709 Crackdown” found that many of the
keywords filtered on WeChat’s chat platform were similar to those filtered by Sina
Weibo’s microblog search feature.
Other research on Internet censorship in China has studied search engines and
various blog providers. Villeneuve [128] analyzed keyword filtering in non-Chinese
search engines localized for the Chinese market and found the implementation of censorship inconsistent. Zhu et al. [141] measured keyword and URL blacklisting across
four search engines in China and similarly found inconsistent implementations of
censorship, although the authors had suspicions that there may exist a shared URL
blacklist. Xia Chu [138] analyzed Bing in China and documented multiple different kinds of censorship techniques used by the site. MacKinnon [98] examined 15
different Chinese blog providers and found that tested keywords were inconsistently
censored and that a significant amount of sensitive political content survived censorship. King et al. [89] collected posts from 1,382 Chinese social media Web sites and,
through statistical analysis comparing censored and uncensored posts, contends that
censorship in China focuses on content that represented, reinforced, or encouraged
collective action.
The previously outlined studies relied on testing samples or observing changes
(e.g., deletions) in a subset of content over a fixed period. However, in this work
I have focused on client-side implementations of censorship and surveillance. This
allows me to extract the entire keyword list used to trigger these functions and
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analyze changes to it over time.
In at least two cases, leaks have revealed the complete keyword lists used by some
Chinese applications to trigger censorship. In 2004, a keyword list used to trigger
censorship in a game bundled with QQ Chat was retrieved through a string dump
of one of QQ Chat’s dynamically linked libraries, which was made possible due to a
lack of encryption [36]. In 2006, a list from an unknown blog provider was published
by the Washington Post [132]. In both of these cases, the complete keyword list from
the application was leaked. However, the two leaked lists were from two different
types of products (instant messaging versus blog provider), and they were leaked
years apart. In this dissertation, I compare contemporaneous keyword lists between
applications in the same industry segment in three different industry segments. In
two of these industry segments, I am also able to compare changes to the lists across
time to determine if they are updated in response to the same news events.
The work most resembling that of this dissertation was that of Hardy [78]. Following my work described in Chapter 3, which reverse engineers censorship in Chinese
instant messaging apps, he found and reverse engineered another instant messaging
app called “LINE.” The app was developed in Japan but included a Chinese blacklist
to target users with Chinese phone numbers. Hardy observed four updates [61] to
the blacklist over its lifetime. I incorporate this data in my analysis in Chapter 4.
Another approach to understanding Chinese censorship is to look at first- or
second-hand accounts from company operators in China. King et al. [90] purchased
Chinese social media software from a popular Chinese software application company
in order to understand how it performed censorship. The software included various
technical means to censor blog posts, but it did not include any keyword blacklist.
Between the software’s user guides and software support teams, King et al. deduced
that the keyword lists different companies used with this software were typically
hand-curated.
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Many second-hand accounts have revealed that Chinese companies receive “directives” from Chinese officials instructing them to censor certain topics. Under the
pseudonym “Mr. Tao,” a technician at a Chinese Internet company documented certain directives that have been sent by Chinese authorities [102]. The Chinese Digital
Times maintains a directory of leaked directives called “Directives from the Ministry
of Truth” [53]. However, in both of these cases, it is unclear the extent to which
Chinese companies follow these directives and to what degree they shape their censorship policy. By analyzing the amount of overlap between the keyword lists that
different companies use, my work in this dissertation measures the maximum extent
to which companies could be receiving and acting upon the same directives.

9

Chapter 3
Censorship in Instant Messaging
Applications
In this chapter we1 describe the censorship and surveillance mechanisms built into
TOM-Skype and Sina UC, two instant messaging (IM) chat applications primarily
used in China. We reverse engineered both applications, revealing the exhaustive
lists of keywords used to trigger censorship and/or surveillance in these applications.
Between April 2011 and January 2013, we discovered a total of 4,256 unique blacklisted keywords.
We wanted to address two questions: what topics do the producers of Chinese
IM products censor by filtering keywords? And do censors receive keywords from a
common source such as the Chinese government—or are they tasked with choosing
which keywords to censor themselves? To answer these questions, we translated
all non-English keywords into English and then categorized them according to their
topic to determine what topics each app censors. We then compared the January
1I

use “we” instead of “I” in this and the following chapters since they are published
collaborative work.
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2013 versions of TOM-Skype and Sina UC’s keyword lists to determine how many
keywords were blocked by both clients, finding that only 3.2% of the keywords in our
dataset were blocked by both.
We summarize our major contributions as follows:
1. We introduce a new reverse engineering technique for sidestepping the “antidebugging” measures that Skype’s software uses to try to prevent reverse engineering.
2. We reveal 4,256 unique keywords used by TOM-Skype and/or Sina UC to
trigger censorship or surveillance.
3. We categorize all of these words according to their topic to determine which
topics are censored by each application.
4. We analyze our dataset for shared keywords amongst TOM-Skype and Sina
UC, finding that only 3.2% of the keywords are featured in both. This strongly
suggests that keyword lists are not directed to these companies from a common
source.

3.1 Background
In this section we provide an overview of TOM-Skype and Sina UC and summarize
the Chinese regulatory environment for instant messaging apps.

3.1.1

TOM-Skype and Sina UC

Skype is a popular chat and VoIP application developed in 2003. TOM-Skype, a
version of Skype modified by TOM Online to target the Chinese market, is what
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a user in mainland China is offered when attempting to download Skype. Skype
and TOM Online established a joint venture, Tel-Online Limited, in 2005 to provide
instant messaging and VoIP services in China. TOM Online is the majority partner
in this joint venture; according to Skype, “TOM Online provides access to Skype for
Chinese customers, using a modified version that follows Chinese regulations, called
TOM-Skype” [120].
Sina UC is a chat program developed by Sina Corporation, the Chinese company
behind the well known Sina Weibo micro-blogging service used in China.
We chose TOM-Skype2 and Sina UC for analysis because these two instant messaging programs implement censorship (and surveillance in the case of TOM-Skype)
inside the client software. According to 2011 reports, Tencent’s QQ Chat is the most
popular, and TOM-Skype is ranked the tenth most-used instant messaging program
in China with 2.1 million unique daily users, and Sina UC currently holds 1.1% of the
market and does not appear in the top ten most used instant messaging programs in
China [33, 67]. Although these apps do not command a large amount of the Chinese
market by proportion, they do in absolute numbers, each having millions of daily
users. Moreover, as TOM-Skype was created specifically to deal with China’s unique
regulatory environment, comparing it to ordinary Skype will reveal what additional
rules China’s regulatory environment requires. As TOM-Skype is used to communicate with Skype users outside of China who may be more likely to introduce sensitive
topics, it may especially be under scrutiny from the Chinese government. Sina UC
is noteworthy for being produced by Sina, the company responsible for operating the
immensely popular Sina Weibo micro-blogging platform, and so insights into censorship on Sina UC reveals how one of China’s largest technology companies implements
censorship in their instant messaging application.
2 TOM-Skype

includes Voice-over-IP (VoIP) features; however, our analysis focuses only
on text chat functionality.
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3.1.2

Chinese Regulatory Environment of Instant Messaging
Apps

All Internet companies in China are held responsible for the content they host [98].
Authorities often provide directives to companies to direct them to censor certain
content. News websites, for example, receive directives from “local departments in
charge of news propaganda” or “public security departments” to remove articles with
objectionable content [30]. Company censors are then required to adjust their list of
“filter words” to account for the recently deleted content. Search engines similarly
maintain lists of keywords and web addresses that cannot appear in result pages [81].
In 2009, documents leaked by an employee of Baidu, China’s leading search engine,
provided a glimpse into the company’s censorship and monitoring policies. The
documents contained guidelines on identifying information for censorship and lists
of filtered keywords and URLs [37]. Among those terms and subjects identified
for censorship were words concerning collective assembly and social mobilization
(e.g., “demonstration”), government repression (e.g, “The use of force to suppress”),
specific events and people (e.g., “9.12 events”), and various other terms (e.g., “AIDS,”
“land”).
Both TOM Online and Sina Corporation summarized Chinese government controls relevant to their operations in filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, which offer some insight into the labyrinthine information control requirements that Internet companies in China must navigate. For example, Sina’s
annual report for 2011 illustrates the following circumstances of relevance [119]:

• Companies must obtain appropriate licensing from government authorities to
conduct operations. Licenses are required to provide “basic” or “value-added”
telecommunications services, the latter of which are defined as “telecommunications and information services provided through public networks.” Additional
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licensing requirements apply to provision of Internet content services, which
vary according to the content at issue. Specific approvals are also required to
provide BBS services, namely, “electronic bulletin boards, electronic forums,
message boards and chat rooms.” Some licenses are subject to annual inspection.
• Companies must comply with extensive laws and regulations governing the provision of various Internet services. The filing details the numerous measures
relevant to Sina’s services, including thirteen laws and regulations specific to
information security and censorship. “According to these laws and regulations,
it is mandatory for Internet companies in the PRC [People’s Republic of China]
to complete security-filing procedures and regularly update information security and censorship systems for their websites with the local public security
bureau.”
• Companies must actively guard against disclosure of “state secrets.” “[T]he
newly amended Law on Preservation of State Secrets which became effective
on October 1, 2010 provides that whenever an Internet service provider detects
any leakage of state secrets in the distribution of online information, it should
stop the distribution of such information and report to the authorities of state
security and public security. Internet service providers are required to delete
any content on its website that may lead to disclosure of state secrets. Failure
to do so on a timely and adequate basis may subject us to liabilities and
penalties.”
• Companies that maintain news websites or Internet portals must rely on continued cooperation with state-owned media for certain types of content. “[T]he
PRC government has the ability to restrict or prevent state-owned media from
cooperating with us in providing certain content to us, which will result in
a significant decrease of the amount of content we can publish on our web-
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sites. We may lose users if the PRC government chooses to restrict or prevent
state-owned media from cooperating with us, in which case our revenues will
be impacted negatively.” Such reliance provides government authorities with
additional leverage in controlling industry.

Facilitating company compliance with government mandates are “self-discipline”
drives and the presence of Party branches and committees internal to the companies. For example, the Internet Society of China issued the Public Pledge on
Self-Discipline for the Chinese Internet Industry in 2002, which obliges “voluntary”
signatories to refrain “from producing, posting, or disseminating pernicious information that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability, contravene
laws and regulations and spread superstition and obscenity…” and to “monitor the
information publicized by users on websites according to law and remove the harmful
information promptly” [83, 81]. At the same time, the Communist Party of China
(CPC) maintains a heavy presence within Internet companies, organizing its members and establishing Party Committees within these entities [87, 88]. Sina, Baidu,
social network Kaixin, and at least six other Internet companies are reported to
have formed internal Party organizations [88]. And in November 2012, a new CPC
“Capital Internet Society Committee” was established to expand Party presence and
strengthen the Party’s governing capacity and development work in the Internet
industry in Beijing, including among smaller Internet companies [140, 87].
With such extensive involvement of industry, however, and the evolving nature
of the online environment, application of information controls, i.e., how censorship
and surveillance within the industry are actually implemented, appears to vary according to the circumstances of the platform or company at issue, activities of users,
and the fluctuating policy priorities of local and central authorities. For example,
Sina noted it had encountered certain difficulties in fully complying with microblog
real-name registration requirements: “Although we have made significant efforts to
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comply with the verification requirements, for reasons including existing user behavior, the nature of the microblogging product and the lack of clarity on specific
implementation procedures, we have not been able to verify the identities of all of
the users who post content publicly on Weibo” [119]. Additionally, in January 2013,
a Sina Weibo manager responded to user criticism regarding Weibo censorship of
references to the Southern Weekly incident by publicly expressing frustration over
the government’s censorship requirements and attempting to explain the company’s
considered trade-offs in the monitoring process [94]. Continuously changing legal
requirements and vaguely defined content categories, necessitating individual company interpretation, may result in additional variations in censorship practices across
platforms and providers.
Moreover, such amorphous application of information controls may lend itself to
unanticipated abuses, as evidenced in recent reporting examining China’s “black PR”
industry and documenting instances of corruption surrounding practices of keyword
blocking and content deletion [65].

3.2 Methodology

We analyzed each of TOM-Skype and Sina UC for censorship and surveillance behavior. Using packet sniffing, we discovered from which URL each client downloads
its keyword lists and, for each client that sends surveillance messages, to which URL
it uploads those messages. To decrypt the keyword lists and surveillance messages,
we used a variety of reverse engineering techniques as appropriate for each client,
which we describe below.
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3.2.1

Sina UC Censorship

Sina UC had no built-in measures to resist reverse engineering, and so we were able
to directly use reverse engineering tools such as IDA Pro [23] and Ollydbg [24] to
directly analyze the application. Sina UC like most contemporaneous IM programs
contained a large amount of executable code. Sina UC specifically contained over 80
Windows Dynamic Link Library (DLL) files, which are library files containing compiled machine code that can be updated modularly. These files together comprised
over 30 megabytes. Since the code responsible for decrypting Sina UC’s downloaded
keyword lists was expected to be only kilobytes in size, finding it was equivalent to
searching for a needle in a haystack.
To facilitate this search, we used tools for finding cryptographic constants used
by well-known cryptographic algorithms inside a program’s address space as it is
running. We found a number of cryptographic constants for different algorithms.
Among them were constants for the Blowfish algorithm. By familiarizing ourselves
with the Blowfish algorithm, we determined the constants that should be referenced
by the algorithm’s key scheduler. By looking at which functions referenced those
constants, we found the function implementing the key scheduler. We then set a
breakpoint on the key scheduler function, ran Sina UC, and witnessed the Blowfish
key passed to the scheduler as a function argument.

3.2.2

TOM-Skype Censorship

We reverse engineered the TOM-Skype 3.6–4.2 and TOM-Skype Mobile’s keyword
list’s cryptography by employing a type of attack called a chosen ciphertext attack,
i.e., an attack that obtains information by observing the decryption of specifically
chosen ciphertexts. These versions of the TOM-Skype clients perform a DNS lookup
for the address of the server used to download the keyword lists. By modifying the
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1: procedure Decrypt(C0..n , P1..n )
2:
for i ← 1, n do
3:
Pi = (Ci ⊕ 0x68) − Ci−1 (mod 0xff)
4:
end for
5: end procedure

Figure 3.1: Algorithm for decrypting TOM-Skype 3.6–3.8 keyfiles

client’s operating system’s “hosts” file, we hardcoded the address of our own server
to be returned in response to the lookup. This causes the client’s download request
to instead download from our own web server, we were able to completely control
the ciphertext that the client downloads.
The initial ciphertext that we sent to the client was identical to that which
TOM-Skype provided. We knew from previous work [129] that the word “fuck”
was censored, and so by deleting half of the list at a time, we were able to use binary
search to determine which line corresponded to the keyword “fuck.” From there,
we made perturbations to the ciphertext until we were able to infer the algorithm
described in Figure 3.1.
We found that TOM-Skype 5.0–5.1’s keyword lists were downloaded from and decrypted in ContentFilter.exe, a separate process from Skype.exe. They are encrypted
using a 256-bit key that was originally known to have been used in TOM-Skype
2.5 [70]. The key appears to have been intended to be 32 ASCII-encoded characters,
but the 32 characters were UTF16-encoded, and so only the first 16 characters fit
into the 256-bit key, where the other 16 of the 32 bytes are null bytes.
Reverse engineering the cryptography for TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1’s keyword lists
was challenging. These lists were downloaded and decrypted inside Skype.exe itself,
not a separate process as with TOM-Skype 5.0–5.1. The ordinary Skype client
is known to contain sophisticated anti-debugging measures that resist traditional
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reverse engineering techniques [69], and we found that TOM-Skype inherits these
measures.
We circumvented these measures by using DLL injection, a technique for running
arbitrary code inside of another process’s address space. We used this technique
to hook API functions, which allows us to substitute an API function’s behavior
with behavior of our own. We first hooked the API function that the client uses
to download the keyword lists, which allowed us to obtain information about the
thread used to download and decrypt the lists including the return address for each
caller on that thread’s call stack. We then hooked into the API function used to
create threads and, when it created a thread matching the criteria that we previously
discovered, we had it create the thread in a suspended state. From there, we attached
with a debugger, suspended all other threads to avoid anti-debugging measures, and
resumed our thread of interest. We were then able to analyze the behavior of the
resumed thread using standard reverse engineering tools.

3.2.3

TOM-Skype Surveillance

We were able to reverse engineer the cryptography used for surveillance messages in
TOM-Skype 5.1 using standard tools, since the surveillance was done in ContentFilter.exe, a separate process from Skype.exe that does not contain the same antidebugging measures. Although TOM-Skype 4.0–4.2 and 5.5–6.1 perform surveillance
inside of Skype.exe, we found that they used the same cryptography for surveillance
as 5.1.
Reverse engineering the cryptography used for surveillance messages in TOMSkype 3.6–3.8 was more challenging, since they perform surveillance inside of the
Skype.exe executable itself. However, we used a similar DLL injection strategy as
we used to reverse engineer TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1’s keyword list cryptography. We
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List

HTTP URL

TOM-Skype 3.6–3.8

skypetools.tom.com/agent/newkeyfile/keyfile

TOM-Skype 4.0–4.2

a1.skype.tom.com/installer/agent/keyfile

TOM-Skype 5.0–5.1

skypetools.tom.com/agent/keyfile

TOM-Skype 5.1
(Surveillance-only)

skypetools.tom.com/agent/keyfile_u

TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1

a1.skype.tom.com/installer/agent/keyfile5.5/keyfile

TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1
(Surveillance-only)

a1.skype.tom.com/installer/agent/keyfile5.5/keyfile_u

TOM-Skype Mobile

skypetools.tom.com/agent/newkeyfile/keyfile_a

Sina UC Lists 1–5

im.sina.com.cn/fetch_keyword.php?ver=8.3.4.22616

Table 3.1: Lists used by TOM-Skype and Sina UC and their HTTP URLs

knew from looking at other versions of TOM-Skype that they reseed the random
number generator before sending surveillance messages to generate random padding
bytes, and so we hooked an API function normally used to generate the seed to
instead suspend the thread when it was called with a specific return address that we
had determined through trial by error. Then, as before, we were able to attach with
a debugger, suspending all other threads except the thread of interest, and reverse
engineer that thread avoiding Skype’s anti-debugging measures.

3.3 Technical Analysis
In this section we outline how the censorship and surveillance mechanisms of each
app operate.
We collected a number of different lists for both the TOM-Skype and Sina UC
clients. For TOM-Skype, different versions of the client use different lists downloaded
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List

Function

TOM-Skype 3.6–3.8

Chat censorship, chat surveillance

TOM-Skype 4.0–4.2

Chat censorship, chat surveillance

TOM-Skype 5.0–5.1

Chat censorship, chat surveillance

TOM-Skype 5.1
(Surveillance-only)

Chat surveillance

TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1

Chat censorship, chat surveillance

TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1
Chat surveillance
(Surveillance-only)
TOM-Skype Mobile

Chat censorship, chat surveillance

Sina UC List 1

Combined functionality of Sina UC Lists 2–5

Sina UC List 2

Username and mood indication censorship

Sina UC List 3

–

Sina UC List 4

One-to-one chat censorship

Sina UC List 5

Group chat censorship

Table 3.2: Lists used by TOM-Skype and Sina UC and their functions

from different URLS (see Table 3.1), and in later versions of the client, use separate
lists for censorship and/or surveillance. All versions of the Sina UC client use the
same set of lists, with the lists serving different functions (see Table 3.2).
The TOM-Skype client contains built-in lists of keywords and downloads new lists
using HTTP requests. The client uses one of these two lists to censor incoming or
outgoing text chat; however, the various versions of the clients differ in their built-in
lists, the source of the list updates they download, and whether they censor incoming
and/or outgoing chat messages or perform surveillance. Most versions of the client,
upon censoring an incoming or outgoing chat message, will send a log of the message
content and sender information to TOM-Skype servers through HTTP requests.
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List(s)

Cryptography

Cryptographic key

TOM-Skype 3.6–3.8 and
4.0–4.2

“Homebrew” XOR –

TOM-Skype 5.0–5.1 and
5.1 Surveillance-only

AES+ECB

"0\0s\0r\0␣\0T\0M\0#\0R\0" +
"W\0F\0D\0,\0a\04\03\0␣\0"

TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1 and
5.5–6.1 Surveillance-only

DES+ECB

"\x7a\xdd\xe7\xdc" +
"\x23\x25\x53\x75"

TOM-Skype Mobile

“Homebrew” XOR –

Sina UC Lists 1–5

Blowfish+ECB

"H177UC09VI67KASI"

Table 3.3: List of cryptographic algorithms and keys used by the TOMSkype and Sina UC clients

The Sina UC client censors incoming and outgoing messages as well as usernames.
While the client does not perform surveillance itself, it is possible that server-side
surveillance is performed. The client contains five built-in lists that are updated
through HTTP. Each list serves a different purpose. The first list censors incoming
and outgoing one-to-one text chat, group chat, and usernames (replacing the username with an ID number); the second list censors only usernames; the fourth list

Client(s)

Cryptography

Cryptographic key

TOM-Skype 3.6–4.2

DES+ECB (using only first 6 of 8
bytes of each plaintext block)

32bnx23l

TOM-Skype 5.0

No surveillance

–

TOM-Skype 5.1–6.1 DES+ECB (using only first 6 of 8
and Mobile
bytes of each plaintext block)

X7sRUjL\0

Table 3.4: List of cryptographic algorithms and keys used for surveillance
by TOM-Skype clients
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Clients

Example surveillance message

TOM-Skype 3.6–4.2 JohnDoe fuck you 12/31/2011 6:00:00 PM 1
TOM-Skype 5.0

No surveillance

TOM-Skype 5.1

fuck you 12/31/2011 6:00:00 PM 1

TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1 JohnDoe fuck you 12/31/2011 6:00:00 PM 1 JaneDoe
TOM-Skype Mobile

JohnDoe fuck you 2011-12-31 18:00:00 1

Table 3.5: Surveillance message triggered when JaneDoe receives “fuck
you” from JohnDoe

censors incoming and outgoing one-to-one text chat; and the fifth list censors group
chat. (The third list has no functionality in the version of Sina UC we analyzed.)

Clients used a variety of cryptographic algorithms to encrypt keyword lists and
surveillance messages, ranging from well-known algorithms to a “homebrew” algorithm (see Figure 3.1) that does not provide much security.

We found that all versions of TOM-Skype analyzed except 5.0 perform surveillance, and that versions differ in what information they send in their surveillance
logs. Most clients include the sender of the triggering message, the triggering message in its entirety, the date and time, and a 0 or 1 to indicate if that message
was outgoing or incoming, respectively. TOM-Skype 5.1 sends the least comprehensive surveillance logs that do not include the sender, whereas TOM-Skype versions
5.5–6.1 send the most comprehensive surveillance logs, including the recipient of the
message in addition to the sender.
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Character type(s)

Number of
keywords

Example(s)

(72%) 3069

遛似

ASCII only

(12%) 518

six 4

ASCII and CJK

(15%) 645

six月four日

CJK including spaces only

Cyrillic

5

Восемь-Девять-Шесть-Четыре

Unicode roman numerals

6

Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅵ Ⅳ

Unicode full-width latin

10 ｑｑｑｑｑ

Other

3

six—four (em dash), ⑥④, ⑥㈣

Table 3.6: Breakdown of character types in the keyword lists

3.4 Keyword Analysis
Collection of the keyword lists began on April 24, 2011 (TOM-Skype) / August 8,
2011 (Sina UC) and ended on January 31, 2013, with the latest changes occurring
on December 20, 2012 (TOM-Skype) / October 11, 2012 (Sina UC). In total, the
dataset consists of 88 lists, which combined contain 4,256 unique keywords. The lists
range in size from 1 to 1,421 unique keywords.
Of the 4,256 keywords, 3,070 keywords (72%) contain only Chinese characters
(specifically, characters in the CJK range of Unicode), 518 (12%) contain only ASCII
characters and 645 (15%) have a combination of both. Among the 518 containing
only ASCII characters, 52% of these were URLs or URL-like strings. Five words
were in Cyrillic, six keywords contain Unicode Roman numeral characters and 10
keywords comprise Unicode fullwidth Latin characters.
Each keyword was translated from Chinese to English by a fluent Chinese speaker
and accompanied with descriptions of the political and social context behind the
keyword. Based on these contextual descriptions, we coded the keywords into 61

24

Chapter 3. Censorship in Instant Messaging Applications
% of words in theme

TOM-Skype
Sina UC

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Events
Misc
People
Political
Social

Technology

Figure 3.2: Themes by client

content categories grouped under six broad themes: Political (content related to the
Chinese government or political issues, e.g., human rights, freedom of expression,
ethnic groups, religious movements, etc.); Social (content perceived as socially sensitive or undesirable, e.g., pornography, gambling, illicit weapons and drugs, etc.);
People (names of individuals, e.g., government officials, political dissidents); Events
(scheduled events, recurring events, current events); Technology (e.g., general technical terms, websites, spyware, URLs, etc.) and Miscellaneous (e.g., terms without
clear context).
Overall we found very little overlap in keywords between the clients: 138 keywords
(3.2%) distributed across 29 categories and all six themes were shared in common
between TOM-Skype and Sina UC lists, represented primarily in the categories of
CPC member / Government official (21 keywords), Prurient interests (19), Dissident
/ Activist (18), Religion (15), and Tiananmen Square (13) (see Figure 3.2).

3.4.1

Political

Within the “political” theme a wide range of issues are covered, including CPC politics, Chinese democracy movement, corruption scandals, ethnic groups, and religious
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Figure 3.3: Political categories by client

movements. While there is little overlap in unique keywords between the clients, the
keyword lists show common concern for the category issues. Figure 3.3 shows a
breakdown of political categories.

3.4.2

People

Within the “people” theme the most prominent category references members of
the CPC. Second to that are of names of individual activists or political dissi-

26

Chapter 3. Censorship in Instant Messaging Applications

TOM-Skype

% of People keywords by category
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Figure 3.4: People categories by client

dents. Between the TOM-Skype and Sina UC lists combined there are 179 keywords
with the names of individual activists or political dissidents (e.g., Ai Weiwei, Chen
Guangcheng, Wu’erkaixi).

This theme also references relatives of CPC members,

and perpetrators and victims of violent crimes. (See Figure 3.4 for a breakdown.)

3.4.3

Events

In general, TOM-Skype lists contained more references to specific events, with the
exception of the 190 words in Sina UC lists relating to the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen
Square massacre. TOM-Skype lists included keywords relating to all 21 events we
identified, while Sina UC lists referred to only eight of these events. (See Figure 3.5
for a breakdown.)

3.4.4

Social

Keywords in the “social” theme were primarily in two categories: Illicit goods and
services, which included the trafficking of illicit materials like narcotics, weapons and
counterfeit goods; and Prurient interest, which generally referred to pornography and
prostitution. Illicit goods and services is the largest single category in the dataset
with 677 total keywords; Prurient interest is the second largest category with 663
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Figure 3.5: Event categories by client

total keywords. (See Figure 3.6 for a breakdown.)

3.4.5

Technology

The largest proportion of keywords in the “technology” category were URLs in Sina
UC lists. The inclusion of URLs on censorship lists was likely a mechanism of preventing the spread of malicious links or spam. Next most common were generic
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Figure 3.7: Technology categories by client

technical terms, which also appeared most frequently in the Sina UC lists. Many of
these were very general, including “Administrator” (“管理员”) and “System notification” (“系统通知”) on Sina list 2, which may be a means of preventing users from
creating usernames that allow them to impersonate Sina administrative accounts.
Also in this category were the names of prominent websites, including “Chinese language Wikipedia” (“中 文 维 基 百 科”) and “Google Blogger” (“谷 歌 博 客”). (See
Figure 3.7 for a breakdown.)
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3.4.6

Targeted and Broad Keywords

Many of the keywords are highly targeted. For example, the TOM-Skype lists contain
the keyword “Corning West and Da Zhi Street intersection, Century Lianhua gate”
(“西大直街康宁路路口世纪联华”), the address of a planned Jasmine rally.
Other keywords are extremely generic. For example, the TOM-Skype 5.1 surveillance lists include “Han People” (“汉 人”) (the majority ethnic group in China),
“Chinese person” (“华人”), “world wide web” (“万维”), and “Internet” (“互联网”).
The inclusion of these common terms likely causes the messages of a large number
of users to be surveilled. In addition, these keywords appear too broad to be useful
for routine surveillance, and suggest that either TOM-Skype is overzealous in its
efforts to enforce government-mandated surveillance or is using additional criteria to
identify messages or users to be surveilled [129].
Sina UC List 2 contains a number of generic keywords such as “system” (“系统”)
and “chat” (“聊天”). This list is used for censoring usernames, and it is possible
these keywords exist to prevent users from impersonating system administrators or
functions of the client.

3.4.7

Adaptation to Censorship Evasion

The keywords also indicate that censors adapt to the censorship evasion techniques
employed by Chinese Internet users who frequently use creative language and homophones to evade censorship [35]. As Chinese dialects are tonal languages, Internet
users often use similar words with variations in tone or different characters represented by the same tone to impart the meaning of a character that is otherwise
censored. Users will also take advantage of visual similarities between different characters to imply the meaning of a banned character or word. The variation in keywords
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seen in the lists demonstrates that censors are highly aware of and adaptive to the
techniques that users employ to attempt to evade censorship and surveillance.
For example, keyword lists included the name of disgraced politician “Bo Xilai”
(“薄熙来”), as well as “博西莱” (“Bo Xilai” with the same pronunciation and tones,
but different characters), and “B〇稀莱” (“BO Xilai” with character variation of
two kinds). Similarly, numerous homonyms for “Jasmine” (茉莉花) appeared on the
various TOM-Skype lists. In some cases the censored words included combinations of
Chinese characters with English words, numbers and symbols. The breadth of these
combinations is seen in keywords related to the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square
massacre, a highly sensitive topic that is the subject of intense censorship. The
censored lists contain many terms referring to June Fourth, such as variations of sixfour expressed in Chinese (六四, six四); Roman numbers (Ⅵ Ⅳ), equations (6.2+2,
32x2), symbols (⑥④), and dates (May 35th (五月三十五), March 96th (三月九十
六号)).

3.4.8

Keyword List Changes

We began monitoring for daily changes to the TOM-Skype lists beginning April 24,
2011, and the Sina UC lists beginning August 8, 2011, with the collection period
ending January 31, 2013. Lists from both clients underwent significant fluctuations
over the course of the study, in some cases increasing rapidly in size and shrinking to
a single keyword within a short time frame. The result of these changes is that the
censorship and surveillance mechanisms in the clients are significantly altered. In
addition, there were a number of anomalies observed in the results that are difficult
to explain but that may reflect technical misconfiguration on the part of TOM-Skype
or Sina UC administrators.
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TOM-Skype Keyword List Changes
In May 2011, the TOM-Skype 5.1 Surveillance-only list rapidly increased in size to
1,421 unique keywords, only to decrease the next day back to 399 keywords. The
censorship lists for versions 5.0–5.1 decreased to a single keyword (at one point containing a string of seemingly random characters) in April 2011, while the censorship
lists for versions 5.5–6.1 increased from one keyword “Rong Shoujing” (“荣守京”) to
that same keyword 1,134 times and back to that single keyword a day later.
On September 20, 2012, an update to the TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1 Surveillance-only
list was sent to clients with a number of added keywords relating to the island
dispute with Japan. However, these keywords used an encryption scheme from TOMSkype 3.6 that was no longer in use, which rendered these keywords unusable for
triggering surveillance. These keywords were added again the next day with the
same incorrect encryption scheme. It is possible that TOM-Skype administrators
noticed that surveillance for these keywords was not functioning and attempted to
add them again, but without success. As of January 31, 2013, these keywords are
still incorrectly encrypted, despite newer keywords having been added to the list with
the correct encryption.
The censorship keyword lists for the recent versions of the client have also been
reduced to a single keyword, meaning that these clients are now effectively only
performing surveillance. TOM-Skype versions 3.6–4.2, which, unlike the recent versions, do not have a separate surveillance-only list, still have censorship keyword lists
containing hundreds of keywords that were last updated in March 2012.

Sina UC Keyword List Changes
The Sina UC lists similarly underwent a number of changes for unknown purposes
that represent a shift in the functionality of censorship in the client. Over the course
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Figure 3.8: The number of unique keywords in TOM-Skype lists over time

of seven months in 2012, Sina UC List 3 shifted from 50 keywords to 880 before
eventually being reduced to a single keyword. List 1 shrank to a single keyword in
September 2012. List 4 went from 380 to 21 to 855 keywords over the span of three
months, before also shrinking to a single keyword. List 5, like lists 1, 3 and 4, was
reduced to a single keyword in September 2012. The single keyword was different on
each of these four lists, ranging from a reference to Tiananmen Square to keywords
in the prurient interest category. It is conceivable that a single keyword was used
because the censorship functions of the client require a non-zero list to function. List
2, which censors usernames, is the only list with multiple keywords remaining (476
keywords as of October 11, 2012). As a result, most client-side messaging censorship
has been eliminated in the client. We discuss the possible implications of this change
in the following section.
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Changes in Censorship and Surveillance Focus

One of the unexpected changes we observed was fluctuation in the keyword lists that
effectively rendered the latest versions of TOM-Skype to be focused on surveillance
only (rather than also focusing on censorship), and seemingly caused Sina UC to
only focus on username censorship.
In the case of TOM-Skype the shift to surveillance-only keyword lists was correlated with the Jasmine Rallies, which could potentially signify pressure from authorities or an independent decision made on the part of the company to monitor
discussions of sensitive events, particularly those that may lead to social mobilizations.
For Sina UC the changes are difficult to explain. Given China’s legal and reg-
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ulatory restrictions it is unlikely that the company would discontinue censorship
features. However, it is possible that, like TOM-Skype, Sina UC has also switched
to a surveillance focus but is implementing these features on the server side, which
would not be detected by our reverse engineering methods. Due to the peer-to-peer
architecture of (TOM-)Skype, surveillance and censorship must be implemented on
the client side. Of all the Chinese IM programs on the market, TOM-Skype and
Sina UC are the only ones we are aware of that implement censorship or surveillance
features on the client side.
Additional exploratory testing we conducted further supports the hypothesis that
there may be a move away from a censorship focus in IM clients. In April 2012, we
attempted to send messages containing the keywords from the TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1
Surveillance-only list through QQ Chat. In total, nine keywords from that list were
found filtered, mostly relating to the Falun Gong. In a similar experiment, 15 words
from the Sina UC lists were found censored on QQ Chat, also relating to the Falun
Gong. Repeating this experiment in February 2013, zero words from either list were
found filtered on QQ Chat, even when performing the experiment tunneled through
a VPN in China. Both experiments demonstrate the lack of overlap in censored
content between the different clients, and the most recent results suggest that the
focus may have shifted to server-side surveillance.
China’s most popular IM program, QQ Chat, and new applications quickly rising
in popularity such as WeChat, are suspected to have surveillance features [86, 75],
but no technical analysis has yet been able to confirm their existence or operation
as server-side surveillance by its nature is difficult to measure. Unlike server-side
censorship, which can be at least partially measured with sample testing, server-side
surveillance is difficult to measure because it has no observable effect on messages under surveillance. Unlike client-side surveillance, which can be reverse engineered, the
code implementing server-side surveillance is running on a remote machine, making
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it inaccessible to reverse engineering methods.
If the majority of Chinese companies providing IM programs are engaging in
surveillance, the potential for massive violations of privacy is acute. It is clear that
Chinese companies are obliged to cooperate with government investigations, maintain and disclose records and reports to security authorities, and terminate transmission of state secrets [80]. Yet it is unclear how these regulations affect how private
companies decide what specific content to target for surveillance, and what level
of government oversight into company practices exists. These obligations to the
government and the risk of penalties for non-compliance could be an incentive for
overly broad keyword triggers to ensure persistent capture of user data. At the same
time, however, our analysis observed inconsistent patterns in how sensitive topics
and events were targeted for surveillance.

Jaccard similarity between initial and current lists
Calculating the Jaccard similarity coefficient (the size of the intersection of two sets
divided by the size of their union) between the set of words in the most recent
versions of lists and the first versions reveals that in most cases, the current lists are
significantly different from what they started as. The exceptions to this are Sina UC
List 2, which has a similarity coefficient of 0.76, and TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1, whose first
and last lists contain the same single word (discussed above). All other lists have a
coefficient of 0.09 or lower. Coefficients (excluding sources with only one version of
a list) are shown in Table 3.7.

3.4.9

Changes in Response to Events

One of the unique aspects of this dataset is that it provides visibility into how the
censorship and surveillance keyword lists change over time. Analyzing these changes
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Source

Similarity

TOM-Skype 3.6–3.8

0.03

TOM-Skype 4.0–4.2

0.09

TOM-Skype 5.0–5.1

0

TOM-Skype 5.1 (Surveillance-only)

0

TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1

1.0

TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1 (Surveillance-only)

0.09

Sina UC List 1

0.005

Sina UC List 2

0.76

Sina UC List 3

0

Sina UC List 4

0

Sina UC List 5

0

Table 3.7: Jaccard similarity between first and last lists

provides insight into how these two companies respond to dynamic political and
social events through updates to the keyword lists.
Events referenced in the keyword lists include the following types: past events
(e.g., 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China), national holidays
and anniversaries (e.g., June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, National Day of
the People’s Republic of China), scheduled events (e.g., 18th National Congress of
the Communist Party of China) and current events (defined as events that occurred
within our data collection period).
TOM-Skype lists include substantially more event-related keywords (including
current and recurrent events). Sina UC lists have very little focus on current events
but a greater number of keywords related to recurrent events. For example, the Sina
UC lists include 190 keywords (10.5%) related to the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square
massacre, whereas TOM-Skype included 95 such keywords (3.7%).

37

Chapter 3. Censorship in Instant Messaging Applications
In order to track how the two companies implemented keyword changes in response to current events, we identified six events referenced in the dataset that occurred within our data collection timeframe. Keywords related to only two of these
events appeared on both Sina UC and TOM-Skype lists.
Across the selected cases we observed inconsistent patterns in how changes were
made around event timelines. In some cases keyword updates were implemented
within a single day of a sensitive event. In others, keywords were added weeks or
months after the event took place, potentially indicating the censors only responded
after an issue developed sufficient political salience. In some cases, seemingly important and sensitive political events that were clearly of concern to the Chinese
government either did not appear in any testing lists or were only represented with
a small number of terms.
The following sections provide analysis of the context behind each event and
correlate the event timelines with keyword updates or lack thereof.

Jasmine Rallies
Following the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 and early 2011,
calls to gather for “Jasmine Rallies” circulated online beginning on February 20, 2011,
with locations of planned rallies in a number of major cities throughout China [84].
While none of the planned events developed into protests, the event scheduled in
Beijing gathered widespread attention after video of U.S. Ambassador to China, Jon
Huntsman, apparently in the area of the designated rendezvous point, was circulated.
Later calls would suggest participants “stroll” near designated locations in a number
of cities so as not to attract police attention. These gatherings, while reportedly
sparsely attended, were met with a significant police presence and saw numerous
reports of arrests and police violence against journalists. Notably, prominent artist
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Ai Weiwei was arrested on April 3 following several Tweets he made discussing the
“Jasmine Revolution” [114].
As our data collection period began in April 2011, two months after the first
rallies, we cannot identify when related keywords were first added to the lists. A
large number of keywords relating to the Jasmine Rallies were already present on
the first lists gathered for both of the clients. In total, 132 keywords were on the
TOM-Skype lists, four were on the Sina UC list and two were present on both lists.
Keywords on the lists include “Next Sunday Jasmine” (“下周日茉莉”), “Western
Thai Square on the 20th” (“西临天泰广场 20日”) and “Jasmine revolution written
backwards” (“命革花莉茉”). Lists from both clients contained “Hold a microphone
to indicate liberty” (“拿着麦克风表示自由”), an instruction for rally participants.
Between April and May 2011, there is a notable change in the presence of Jasminerelated words on the TOM-Skype lists. On April 25, 69 keywords were removed from
the censorship list for TOM-Skype 5.0–5.1, and on May 16, 75 keywords were added
to the TOM-Skype 5.1 Surveillance-only list. This update followed a general pattern
of the keyword lists for the recent versions of the TOM-Skype client transitioning to
surveillance only. It is possible that this change happened in response to the Jasmine
Rallies as a strategy for monitoring mobilization and discussion of sensitive events.

Bo Xilai Scandal
On November 14, 2011, Neil Heywood, a British businessperson based in China, was
found dead in his hotel room in Chongqing province [29]. Heywood had long ties
with the family of Bo Xilai, then the high-profile leader of the Chongqing branch of
the CPC and at one time touted to be in line to join the Politburo Standing Committee, the CPC’s top leadership committee. Heywood’s death would later be deemed a
homicide related to a soured business deal involving Gu Kailai, Bo’s wife, who would
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eventually be convicted of murder. In February 2012, Chongqing police chief Wang
Lijun met with U.S. consular officials in Chengdu, reportedly to provide information on Heywood’s murder and potentially to seek asylum and protection from Bo.
Wang would later be sentenced to 15 years in prison for corruption. Additionally,
leaked reports from the CPC indicated that Bo had been conducting surveillance of
high-level party officials, including tapping the phone of president Hu Jintao. On
March 18, 2012, Bo was dismissed from his position as Chongqing party chief, and in
September 2012 he was expelled from the CPC. The ouster of such a high-ranking
politician marked one of China’s biggest political crises in decades and threatened to
disrupt the carefully-planned leadership transition taking place in November 2012.
Leaked instructions from government authorities on the topic called for media to
refer only to state-sanctioned sources when covering the story [40].
A total of 62 keywords relating to Bo Xilai and the Heywood murder scandal
appear on the lists, predominantly on TOM-Skype. Some of these terms were already
present on the first TOM-Skype and Sina UC lists collected during our data collection
period, which predated the Heywood murder scandal. This is not unexpected, as Bo
was already a prominent and often controversial figure seen as a rising star within the
CPC. On March 21, 2013, 50 keywords were added, including numerous homophones
and variations on the name “Bo Xilai,” such as B〇稀莱 (Bo xī lái), 泊稀莱 (Po xī
lái), 己厚天下 (“not thick, the word below,” a reference to “Bo” literally meaning
“thin”), and “bullshitliar.” On March 29, 2012, nine additional keywords were added
to the same list, including terms calling for collective action in support of Bo, such
as “To support Bo [Xilai] go to Chongqing People’s Square” (“挺薄去重庆人民广
场”) and “March 17 Chongqing People’s Grand Hall” (“3月17日重庆人民大礼堂”).
Although a number of events related to the Bo scandal occurred in late 2011 and
early 2012, the additions to the keyword lists followed shortly after Bo’s March 16,
2012 dismissal as Chongqing party chief.
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Ferrari Crash
On March 18, 2012, Ling Gu, the son of high-ranking CPC official Ling Jihua, was
killed in a car crash outside of Beijing [26]. Ling, as well as two women in the
car who were injured, were reported to be naked, and photographs of the crumpled
Ferrari began circulating online. The incident was politically sensitive for a number
of reasons: Ling Jihua, a close political ally of leader Hu Jintao, was expected to
be promoted during the November 2012 leadership transition. Further, the son of
two government officials driving a luxury car touched on widespread public criticism
over government corruption and inappropriate behavior of the family members of
government officials. Ling Jihua would later be demoted from his position at the
General Office of the CPC Central Committee.
Within a day of the crash, reports emerged that searches for “Ferrari” (“法拉
利”), “Master Ling” (“令公子”), and other related terms had been blocked on Sina
Weibo and search engines Baidu and Soso [72]. While Chinese state media initially
published stories covering the crash, by March 20 a Global Times article about the
incident had been removed.
TOM-Skype lists were updated within a few days of the event. On March 21,
2012, 24 keywords related to the incident were added to the TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1
Surveillance-only list, including several variations on “Beijing Ferrari car accident”
(“北京法拉利车祸”). Eight days later, an additional three keywords were added to
this list, while three of the previous keywords were removed. Notably, none of the
terms added referenced the names of Ling Jihua or Ling Gu specifically.

Church of Almighty God Arrests
On December 19, 2012, Chinese state media reported on the arrest of 500 individuals
associated with the religious group Church of Almighty God, on allegations they had
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spread rumors that the world would end on December 21 in accordance with the last
day of the Mayan calendar [85].
Reports from China Digital Times on December 10, 2012 indicate that official
instructions were issued to media outlets to guard against the creation and spread
of rumors relating to the December 21 prediction, and requesting media to “discontinue reporting on recent public conversion assemblies and other illegal activities
orchestrated by the Almighty God cult” [42]. On December 19, the day media reports of the arrests emerged, four keywords were added to the TOM-Skype 5.5–6.1
Surveillance-only list which related to the religious group, followed the next day by
the addition of four more keywords. The keywords included “red dragon gospel” (“大
红龙福音”), which refers to the group’s term for the CPC, and “God in Henan” (“真
神在河南”), referring to the province where the group was founded. These December
19 and 20 keyword additions were the last instance of TOM-Skype list updates we
observed, and as of January 31, 2013, remain on the list. Other keywords relating
to religious organizations or practices are also present on both lists, most notably 99
keywords relating to Falun Gong.

Wenzhou Train Crash
On July 23, 2011, two high-speed trains travelling near the city of Wenzhou collided,
killing 40 people. The government response to the accident was met with widespread
criticism, including allegations that sections of the damaged trains were ordered to
be buried as a means of hiding evidence [110]. Zhang Dejiang, vice premier in charge
of transportation (and later Bo Xilai’s replacement as party chief of Chongqing)
received criticism for his handling of the rescue operations.
Zhang Dejiang’s name (张德江) was a consistent presence on many of the TOMSkype lists that predated the train crash and subsequent controversy. There were
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no additions of new keywords following the Wenzhou train crash until March 21,
2012, eight months after the incident. A number of terms, all linking Zhang and the
train crash, were added eight days after Zhang replaced Bo Xilai as party chief in
Chongqing. It is notable that the additions on March 21 included nine terms referring
to Zhang’s role in the Wenzhou train crash, including “Vice Premier Zhang, train”
(“张副总动车”) and “Dejiang buried train crash” (“德江动车埋”).
It is unclear why it took eight months for these terms to be added to the TOMSkype lists. It is possible that the controversy achieved additional political salience
after Zhang’s promotion to Chongqing party chief. A number of other terms relating
to Zhang were also added on March 21, 2012, including “Dejiang SARS” (“德江
SARS”), referring to Zhang’s position as party secretary of Guangdong province
where the SARS crisis broke out in 2003, and “Dejiang Nanducase” (“德江南都案”),
referring to a prior controversy involving Zhang and a corruption case at a Chinese
newspaper. Thus, we see that upon being promoted, a number of terms relating
to Zhang were added that reference prior controversies. However, the train crash
itself was a highly sensitive event, coverage of which government officials tried to
limit. Reports leaked online days after the crash indicate that government authorities
issued instructions to print and online media to limit publication of stories about the
incident [38].

Tibetan Self-immolations
Over the course of 2011–2012 an unprecedented wave of self-immolation protests took
place in Tibetan areas of China. The self-immolation of 20-year old monk Phuntsog
on March 16, 2011 marked the beginning of this wave and the first instance of
this controversial form of protest in the Tibetan community since February 2009.
Since March 2011, 119 Tibetans have self-immolated as a form of protest against
CPC policies around Tibet and Tibetan culture, undermining CPC assertions that
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Tibetans favor and benefit from Chinese government policies. Of the 119 Tibetans
who have self-immolated, 100 were confirmed dead following their protest [82]. This
series of self-immolations has been met with aggressive crackdowns by the Chinese
government.
In Sina UC lists, “self-immolation” (“自焚”) is the only keyword related to the
issue, and has been present in Sina UC List 2 since our data collection began. Two
months after the self-immolation of Phuntsog, the keyword “self-immolation” (“自
焚”) was added to the TOM-Skype 5.1 Surveillance-only list; it was subsequently
removed May 17, 2011.
For TOM-Skype, no further self-immolation related keywords were added until
March 21, 2012. Between March 16, 2011, and March 21, 2012, 29 Tibetans selfimmolated. However, the keywords added to TOM-Skype on March 21 focus on only
one incident, the self-immolation of a 30-year old monk named Jamyang Palden. On
March 14, 2012, Jamyang Palden self-immolated, marking the 27th immolation in
Tibetan areas of China since February 2009 and the first in Rebkong (in Tibetan)
/ Tongren (in Chinese) county. The incident was followed by demonstrations of
Tibetan monks and lay persons against Chinese rule. Later on the same day, approximately 4,000 students engaged in protests over Tibetan language rights across
three counties in the Qinghai province: Rebkong (in Tibetan) / Tongren (in Chinese),
Tsekhog (in Tibetan) / Zeku (in Chinese), and Kangtsa (in Tibetan) / Gangcha (in
Chinese) [112]. In the Tsekhog protests, students demanded equality for all nationalities and freedom of language, and called for the end of Chinese military barracks
in the area. The protest’s specific reference to the Chinese military presence was
reported as the first known reference to be made in a protest since the post 2009
self-immolations and subsequent government response began [117]. Additionally, on
March 16, 1,000 Tibetans demonstrated in Gepasumdo county (Tongre in Chinese),
Qinghai province demanding the release of 50 monks who had been detained the
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previous day for raising the Tibetan flag and engaging in peaceful protest [113].

On March 21, 2012, nine keywords were added to TOM-Skype lists (3.6–3.8,
4.0–4.2, 5.5–6.1 Surveillance-only) referencing Jamyang Palden’s self-immolation and
the subsequent protests, including: “Jamyang Palden, Monk” (“加央班旦僧人”),
“students demonstrations” (“学 生 示 威 游 行”), “Amdo - pay respects - Longwu
monastery” (“安 多 日 贡 隆 务 寺”), “Qinghai, student” (“青 海 学 生”), and “Zeku
county, students” (“泽库县学生”). These keywords remain on the TOM-Skype lists.
However, since March 21, 2012, no further self-immolation related keywords have
been added.

A possible explanation for the focus on the self-immolation issue at this specific time is that Jamyang Palden’s self-immolation and the following protests over
March came at a particularly sensitive period. March 10 marks the anniversary of
the 1959 Tibetan uprising and 2008 unrest in Lhasa, which began as observance of
the March 10 anniversary, but turned to riots on March 14. The reportedly large
protests that followed Jamyang Palden’s self-immolation may have prompted Chinese authorities to relay specific instructions to private companies around censoring
and / or surveillance of content related to the events. Therefore, while the issue
did not gain attention previously, the protests in March 2012 could have brought
attention from authorities to enact pressure on companies like TOM-Skype.

However, if Jamyang Palden’s immolation and surrounding protests did force
pressure to react, it is surprising that no further keywords related to the issue are
added to the client lists, as from the last keyword update (March 21) to January 31,
2013, 70 more Tibetans self-immolated, similar demonstrations occurred in Tibetan
areas, and aggressive government responses continued.
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Diaoyu / Senkaku Island Protests

China and Japan have been involved in a territorial dispute over a group of islands
in the East China Sea for decades. The uninhabited islands, referred to as “Diaoyu”
in Chinese, or “Senkaku” in Japanese, have been a source of considerable political tension and public protest. Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands-related content has been
targeted for censorship and surveillance in Chinese IM programs in the past. Keywords related to the issue were present on the 2004 QQ keywords list [36] and in the
TOM-Skype logs collected in 2008 [129].
The island dispute is one of the few current events reflected in the lists of both
TOM-Skype (14 keywords) and Sina UC (8 keywords). Three of these keywords are
common between the clients: “Protect Diaoyu” (“保钓”), “Anti-Japan” (“反日”),
and “Diaoyu Islands” (“钓鱼岛”). All of the Sina UC keywords appear on the earliest
collected list (Sina UC List 2 from August 8 2011, used for censoring usernames),
and were therefore likely present before our data collection began. Keywords specific
to the island dispute on the TOM-Skype lists include “Protect Diaoyu” (“保钓”) and
“Anti-Japan” (“反日”), which were added to the TOM-Skype 5.1 Surveillance-only
list on May 16, 2011 and removed the following day. Outside of May 16, 2011, there
were no keyword updates related to this topic until September 2012 when tensions
around the dispute began to escalate.
Relations between China and Japan over the islands deteriorated following a
public campaign launched by Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara in April 2012, which
sought to raise donations to purchase the islands and place them under control of
the Tokyo municipal government. On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government bought and nationalized three of the islands. The purchase was claimed to be
conducted from the “viewpoint of peaceful and stable management of the Senkaku
Islands” and was also perceived as an attempt to block a purchase by Ishihara [27].
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This move led to the Chinese government denouncing the purchase as an infringement
on Chinese territorial sovereignty [139]. Subsequently, Chinese surveillance ships entered Japanese territorial waters around the islands, and large-scale anti-Japanese
protests broke out in more than 80 cities across China.
The scale and often violent character of the protests led some commentators to
question how the protests were allowed to take place, and speculate on the possibility
of some level of direct or tacit government approval. Suspicions were furthered by
anecdotal reports that in early September previously blocked keywords including
“Anti-Japan Protest” (“反日示威”) and “Boycott Japanese Goods” (“抵制日货”)
were accessible on Weibo search [74, 71].
On September 15, however, amidst growing and aggressive protests, a leaked
directive from the State Council Information Office requested all websites “to inspect
and clear every forum, blog, Weibo post, and other form of interactive content of
material concerning mobilizing anti-Japan demonstrations, stirring up excitement,
rioting and looting…” [39]. Anecdotal reports indicate that on September 18, the
following keywords were blocked on Weibo Search: “beating, smashing and looting”
(“打砸抢”), “Liangmaqiao” (“亮马桥”), the location of the Japanese embassy in
Beijing, “thug” (“暴徒”), and “school closure” (“封校”), apparently related due to a
number of schools being as a result of the escalation of protests [45]. On September
19, a further number of keywords were reported to be blocked on Weibo search: “antiJapan” (“反日”), “anti-Japan” (“抗日”), “smash + car” (“砸+车”), and “smash”
(“打砸”) [44].
These events correlate with changes in the Sina UC and TOM-Skype keyword
lists. On September 17, 10 related keywords were removed from the Sina UC list:
“protect Diaoyu Islands” (“保钓”), “anti-Japan” (“反日”), “vandalism” (“打砸抢”),
“boycott Japanese products” (“抵制日货”), “Japanese embassy” (“日本大使馆”),
“Japanese embassy” (“日本使馆”), “Japanese consulate” (“日本领事馆”), “demon-
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strate” (“游行”), and “Diaoyu islands” (“钓鱼岛”).
On September 20, 11 related keywords were added to the TOM Skype 5.5–6.1
Surveillance-only list: “protesting at embassy” (“使馆游行”), “protect Diaoyu islands” (“保钓”), “sailing out and landing on the island” (“出海登岛”), “anti-Japan”
(“反日”), “throwing eggs” (“扔鸡蛋”), “protest” (“抗议”), “slogan” (“标语”), “banner” (“横幅”), “demonstrate” (“游行”), “molotov cocktail” (“燃烧瓶”), “demonstration” (“示威”), “joint” (“联署”).
The TOM-Skype keyword updates follow the pattern of increased restrictions
around the issue following the September directive. However, the removal of keywords used to trigger username censorship on Sina UC do not appear to have any
sensical purpose and could be the product of a technical or human operator error.

Sensitive Events Without References on Keyword Lists
In contrast to the above cases, notable political developments occurred during the
collection period that were either not represented or seemingly underrepresented in
the keyword lists. Given the importance of these events, which included organized
protests and China’s once-a-decade leadership transition, relative to other events
that appeared in the keyword lists, their exclusion is unexpected.
In January 2013, controversy emerged after a New Year’s editorial from prominent Guangdong-based newspaper Southern Weekly calling for strengthened constitutional rights was censored. Protests outside the offices of the newspaper led to
arrests, as well as a notice from central government authorities instructing media
and websites to publish a government-sanctioned editorial on the story [46]. Reports
indicated that many terms relating to the controversy were blocked on Sina Weibo.
However, no keywords relating to the controversy were found on any of the keyword
lists.
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A number of sensitive events relating to Hong Kong occurred during the data
collection period but did not appear in any keyword lists. Legislative elections occurred in Hong Kong in September 2012, which led Chinese government authorities
to issue instructions restricting media coverage of the elections [41]. That same
month, widespread protests occurred following a plan by Hong Kong authorities to
introduce changes to the educational curriculum, which were criticized as a means
of indoctrinating students into CPC doctrine [32]. Neither of these events appeared
in the keyword lists, and no keywords relating to Hong Kong were added to the lists
after May 2011.
In November 2012, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
was held, hosting the once-a-decade leadership transition that saw Xi Jinping become
paramount leader of the CPC. This meeting is one of the most important political
events in China, made even more sensitive following the Bo Xilai scandal earlier
in the year. In total, only four keywords relating to the event were added to the
TOM-Skype lists, including “18 great” (“十八大”) and “name successor” (“立接
班人”). These words were added in May 2011, a full year and a half before the
event took place. That these words were added so far in advance of the event is
not necessarily surprising, as China’s leadership transition process is scheduled long
in advance. However, given the heightened sensitivity and significance of the event
and TOM-Skype’s response to other important political developments, the addition
of so few keywords related to the event, as well as the lack of words added in the
period leading up to the event, is unexpected. Reports have indicated that during the
run-up to the Congress in November 2012, Sina Weibo blocked a number of terms
relating to the event [43] and manipulated the results of dozens of CPC officials’
names [108], most of which do not appear in our dataset.
The absence and limited representation of these events on the keyword lists illustrates the challenge in identifying which political events have sufficient importance to
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be added to keyword lists and calls into question how TOM-Online and Sina determine which events to target in their chat clients, as well as how official instructions
are given around them.

3.5 Conclusion
In this work we reverse engineered the censorship mechanisms of Sina UC, an instant messaging app developed by Chinese technology giant Sina. We also developed
a novel application of DLL injection to reverse engineer TOM-Skype, a product of a
joint partnership between Microsoft and TOM to modify Skype to comply with Chinese regulations. This method revealed the exact nature of TOM-Skyp’s censorship
and surveillance mechanisms, whose existence had been first speculated about years
prior.
Unlike other studies of censorship and surveillance in China, our work draws on
complete lists of keywords used to trigger censorship and surveillance in two instant
messaging applications, offering a less biased and more complete picture of censored
and surveiled topics in those programs. Our dataset also enables a comprehensive
view of how information controls were modified in Sina UC and TOM-Skype over a
period of 21 months, providing insight into how and when content was targeted for
censorship or surveillance. We observed some keyword updates that appeared to be
in reaction to politically sensitive events, which in some cases were in line with official
directives given to media and Internet companies. However, other events that were
clearly issues of concern for the CPC and targeted by other Chinese Internet services
were not present in the dataset. This inconsistency raises questions regarding if,
how, and when official directives may be communicated to TOM-Online and Sina
and the level of discretion with which the companies operate.
As an exploratory exercise we compared our dataset to two datasets of words
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found blocked on Weibo collected by Jason Q. Ng [105] and China Digital Times
(CDT) [47]. Only 330 unique keywords from our dataset were found in either of
those datasets. Of the 282 keywords found in both our dataset and [47], 132 were
in TOM-Skype lists, 84 in Sina UC lists and 66 were on the lists of both clients.
Of the 100 keywords found in both our dataset and [105], 29 were in TOM-Skype
lists, 47 in Sina UC lists and 24 were on the lists of both clients. Fifty-two keywords
were shared in common between all three lists. Including the preliminary analysis of
QQ Chat described in Section 3.4.8, these initial comparisons (albeit exploratory and
incomplete) raise questions regarding how the operation and targeting of information
controls may vary between different applications and companies.
Overall our findings suggest that the implementation of censorship and surveillance features in Chinese services can be impacted by the actions of the private companies and operators who manage them. These decisions may affect what keywords
are targeted, from highly specific content that could be used to monitor discussion of
social mobilizations (e.g., Jasmine Rally locations and instructions) to overly broad
keywords that could result in inadvertent blocking and mass surveillance.
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In this chapter we describe the censorship and surveillance mechanisms built into
Chinese chat software by analyzing four of the most popular live streaming platforms in China: YY, Sina Show, 9158, and GuaGua. We reverse engineered these
applications, revealing the exhaustive lists of keywords used to trigger censorship
and/or surveillance in them. We discovered 17,547 unique keywords overall.
We wanted to revisit two questions: what topics do the producers of chat products
censor by filtering keywords? And do censors receive keywords from a common
source such as the Chinese government—or are they tasked with coming up with
the keyword lists themselves? In our previous chapter, although we compared the
exhaustive keyword lists of two contemporary chat apps, these apps were not among
the most popular in their industry segment. In this chapter, we examine the most
popular live streaming apps in China which have hundreds of millions of users. The
17,547 unique sensitive keywords we discover is an order of magnitude larger than
the dataset in the previous chapter.
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We summarize our major contributions as follows:

1. We reveal 17,457 unique keywords used to trigger censorship and/or surveillance in the most popular apps in the live streaming industry segment.
2. We cross-compare these keyword lists in addition to TOM-Skype, Sina UC, and
another available dataset and find mutually little overlap except for products
from the same companies. This demonstrates that these keyword lists cannot
be largely directed to these companies from a common source.
3. We track additions to these lists for 16 months and categorize new keywords
according to their topic.
4. We find that additions to these lists have little overlap in terms of specific
keywords or in terms of the high level topics or events that these keywords are
added in response to.

4.1 Background
In this section, we give a overview of live streaming platforms and summarize the
regulatory framework governing live streaming platforms in China.

4.1.1

Live Streaming Platforms

This study provides a broad look into keyword censorship and surveillance across
live streaming platforms, a popular class of applications in China. Live streaming
platforms combine real-time video streaming and social networking features that
enable users to broadcast content and create interactive groups. One of the most
popular uses is broadcasting karaoke performances. Live streaming platforms are
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Company

Product(s)

Registered Users

MAUs

YY Inc.

YY

861.4 mn.

117.4 mn.

Tian Ge

9158, Sina Show

245.0 mn.

14.4 mn.

Jinhua Changfeng

GuaGua

70 mn.

–

Table 4.1: Live streaming users by platform

primarily monetized through the sale of virtual goods (such as virtual roses) that
users give to performers during broadcasts. While musical performances account
for the majority of revenues, live streaming platforms are expanding to gaming,
education, financial analysis, and online dating applications.
The most popular live streaming platforms in China include YY, Sina Show, 9158,
and GuaGua. YY is developed by YY Inc. based in Guangzhou, China, and is the
largest platform in terms of user population. As of December 2014, YY had 861.4
million registered users and 117.4 million average monthly active users (MAUs) [13].
In November 2012, YY Inc. announced an initial public offering on the Nasdaq stock
market. It is currently the only Chinese live streaming company to be traded on the
US stock market.
Tian Ge Interactive Holdings Limited based in Hangzhou, China owns and operates two live streaming platforms: 9158 and Sina Show. In 2010, Sina Corporation
invested 10 million dollars (representing a 25% stake) in Tian Ge and provided the
company a sole license for the operation of of Sina Show. Tian Ge reports user numbers as aggregates across its platforms and in 2014 had 245 million registered uses
and 14.4 million MAUs [7, 8]. In July 2014, Tian Ge went public on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange.
Jinhua Changfeng Information Technology Co., Ltd., is a privately held company
based in Zhejiang Province, China that provides the GuaGua platform, which as of
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2013 had 70 million registered users [20]. See Table 4.1 for a breakdown of user bases
across live streaming platforms.

4.1.2

Legal and Regulatory Environment in China

In public filings for YY and Tian Ge both companies underline the risk that their
businesses face from potential legal sanctions being brought against them for hosting
prohibited content [6, 13]. The companies also highlight the risk of being affected
by government campaigns such as “Clean the Web 2014,” which was an government
effort to crack down on the creation and dissemination of pornographic content online. During this campaign, Sina Corporation received notices regarding prohibited
content on its platforms and was subsequently fined 5.1 million RMB1 , had licenses
temporarily revoked, and saw its stock price drop as a result. This campaign demonstrates the dynamic nature of Internet regulations in China, and shows companies
are subject to unpredictable enforcement, which can impact their bottom line.
Unlike most other social media platforms in China, live streaming platforms have
an added dimension of sharing revenues with performers. This business model and
the general live streaming user experience encourages performers to keep audiences
engaged and spending on virtual goods. The popularity of live streaming applications, the diversity of real-time media content, and the virtual goods business model
puts these platforms under particular pressure to monitor and manage user activity.

1 RMB,

or renminbi, is the Chinese system of currency.
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4.1.3

Content Monitoring and Censorship on Live Streaming
Platforms

To comply with China’s laws and regulations live streaming platforms manage content through a combination of terms of service (TOS), automated content monitoring
and filtering systems, and dedicated review teams.
YY has an extensive TOS that includes descriptions of prohibited content and
a five-level system for penalties that range from freezing the account from 7 days
(level 1), 30 days (level 2), 120 days (level 3), 360 days (level 4), or permanently
(level 5). Serious violations that warrant a level 4 or 5 response include publishing
pornography; publishing content that endangers national security or undermines national unity, social stability, or national religious policy. Offenses that carry lower
level punishments include vulgar jokes, verbally abusing other users, and copyright
infringement [13]. Performers are expected to obey an additional list of regulations
that include the same high level prohibitions and other specific guidelines on inappropriate attire and performance material. Failure to comply can result in fines and
account suspensions [14].
To enforce these TOS, YY has a team within the data security department that
maintains “24-hour surveillance” on content and is supported by a system that periodically “sweeps” the platform for offensive content and “automatically” filters keywords. The company also describes a voice monitor system that provides “various
alerts on sensitive words or abnormal activities of users, channels, or groups” [13].
Tian Ge has a similar combination of controls. It employs a team of 74 content
monitors who identify TOS violations and enforce internal policies. In public filings
the company describes an image processing system used to detect skin tone and facial
features to flag nudity or “sexually suggestive partial nudity.” Screenshots of video
chat rooms are randomly captured every one to three minutes and processed through
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the detection system. Flagged content is then sent to the content monitoring team for
further review. The company also generally describes audio monitoring and keyword
filtering systems. In addition, it provides the same level of access that its content
monitoring team has to the Jinhua City Municipal Public Security Bureau to allow
the authorities means to “monitor and supervise the activities” on the platform [6].
As GuaGua is a private company less information is available on its internal
operations. In a 2013 interview, co-founder Dong Guanjie claims the platform has
a content management team of over 100 staff [20]. GuaGua’s TOS explains the
company performs automated and manual inspection of content and deletes any
infringements [1]. Similar to YY and Tian Ge emphasis is placed on incentives for
user self-regulation and financial penalties for violations.

4.2 Technical Analysis
In this section, we describe the technical implementations of keyword censorship
and, if present, keyword surveillance in each of the live streaming applications we
analyzed. We reverse engineered these apps using the same general techniques that
we described in the previous chapter to reverse engineer instant messaging apps.
We found that three Chinese live streaming platforms not described in this paper,
VV (51vv.com), Sixroom (6.cn), and BoBo (bobo.com), perform keyword censorship
on the server-side. We determine that an application censors on the server-side by
first ensuring that there are no obvious signs of a client-side censorship implementation such as one of its censored keywords appearing in plain text in any of the
application’s files. Then we compare the packet trace of sending a censored keyword
(e.g., “falun”) with sending a nearly identical uncensored keyword (“galun”) and,
if the application censors by asterisking out sensitive keywords, with sending that
keyword asterisked out (“*****”). If the first comparison is repeatedly similar and,
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if performed, the second comparison is less so, we conclude that the censorship is
server-side. If the application displays a warning message upon entering a censored
message, we also ensure that the warning message does not display when the application has no access to the Internet. We leave it as future work to analyze the
server-side censorship implementations used by these platforms.

4.2.1

YY Censorship and Surveillance

YY 7.1 downloads three different keywords lists with the following names: Finance,
Normal, and High.
The Finance keyword list is downloaded from the following URL:

http://do.yy.duowan.com/financekwordlist

These keywords are downloaded in plain text in UTF8-encoded XML. Keywords in
this list are related to phishing scams. When a user receives a keyword from the list
the following warning message is displayed in the chat window: “YY安全提示：聊天
中若有涉及财产的操作，请一定要先核实好友身份，谨防受骗!” (YY Security Tip:
This chat seems to involve managing assets; please be sure to verify the identity of
a friend to avoid being cheated!).
The Normal keyword list is downloaded from the following URL:

http://do.yy.duowan.com/NormalKWordlist.txt

It is as a base64-encoded list of UTF16-encoded keywords each separated by a carriage return followed by a line feed. If an outgoing or incoming message contains a
keyword from this list, those keywords are asterisked out in the chat window. In the
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case of an outgoing message, those keywords are also asterisked out in the message
sent over the network.
The High keyword list is downloaded from the following URL:

http://do.yy.duowan.com/HighKWordlist.txt

Like the Normal list, it is a base64-encoded list of UTF16-encoded keywords each
separated by a carriage return followed by a line feed. If an outgoing message contains
a keyword from this list, that message is silently filtered. If an incoming message
contains a keyword from this list, it appears in the chat window as a blank message.

YY Surveillance
The keywords from both the Normal and High lists are also used to trigger surveillance. When attempting to send a message containing keywords from either of these
lists, a surveillance message is sent in an HTTP GET request to a URL of the form:

http://sere.hiido.com/do.action?id=<id>&content=<content>

<id> is a hex encoding of a hash computed as
md5(⌊<seconds since unix epoch>/1000⌋+
";username=report"+
";password=pswd@1234").
Note that the username and password appearing in the hashed string are hardcoded;
these are not the username and password of the sender or receiver of the triggering
message. <content> is a base64 encoding of the following string:

59

Chapter 4. Censorship in Live Streaming Platforms
type=2;uid=<sending user id #>;touid=<receiving user id
#>;keyword=<triggering keyword>;txt=<entire triggering message>

Type is hardcoded to 2.

4.2.2

Sina Show Censorship

Sina Show 3.4 comes installed with keyword lists for censoring messages and also
downloads additional keywords remotely from its servers. When an outgoing message
is censored, the message is not sent, and the following warning message is displayed
in the chat window: “系统过滤，你发送的信息含有非法字符，请重新输入！”
(System filter: the message you sent contains illegal words; please re-enter!) When
an incoming message is censored, the contents of the incoming message are replaced
by the following message in the chat window: “发送的消息有非法词汇，已经被
自动屏蔽” (The message sent contains illegal vocabulary; it has been automatically
blocked.)
Sina Show comes installed with a binary database of keywords in a file named
Word_410.ucw and downloads updates for it from the following URL:

http://www.51uc.com/uc_interface/down_policy/Word_410.ucw

This file is a custom binary container storing sensitive GBK-encoded keywords that
have been encrypted using Blowfish-like algorithm in ECB mode with the 8-byte
key Dey,1blE. A standard library implementation of Blowfish cannot be used to
decrypt these keywords, however, as the Blowfish implementation used by Sina Show
is atypical, containing byte endianness inconsistencies and in multiple places shifts
bits by different amounts.
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While these inconsistencies may have been unintentional bugs, they significantly
increased the difficulty of reverse engineering the decryption algorithm. In order to
implement the algorithm we needed to implement Sina Show’s Blowfish algorithm
bug for bug. We first used the Hex-Rays decompiler [2] to decompile the decryption
code to a C-like pseudocode. We then carefully modified the code into compilable
C code while being cautious to not change the program’s semantics. While at this
point we had code that could successfully decrypt Sina Show’s modified Blowfish, the
code was humanly incomprehensible and revealed little insight into what made this
implementation of Blowfish different from others. To flesh out the differences, we
iteratively modified this C code to resemble the source code of a standard Blowfish
implementation, after each modification verifying that the compiled C code could still
decrypt Sina Show’s modified Blowfish. After we could no longer modify the C code
to resemble the standard implementation without changing its behavior, only the
relevant semantic differences remained, revealing the byte endianness inconsistencies
and differences in bit shifts that made Sina Show’s Blowfish implementation different.
After decrypting the keyword database file, we found that each keyword in the
file is associated with a category number from 1 to 8, inclusive, or 12. For this
reason, keywords often appear more than once in this file if they belong to multiple
categories. However, Sina Show at present only utilizes category 5, which it uses to
censor chat messages. If the original purpose of the additional categories was like
that found in Sina UC, it may be the case that the other categories were originally
used to censor usernames or other strings in an older version of the program. As of
May 11, 2015, 888 of the 2709 keywords in this file are in category 5.
Sina Show also has GBK-encoded lists of keywords included in plain text built
into many of its binaries. SinaShow.exe contains a list of 1224 keywords, which
are also included in ChatRoom.dll and Props.dll. UCClient.dll also includes
another list of 910 keywords. However, among all of these built-in keywords, only
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108 keywords, the 1114th through the 1221st keywords in SinaShow.exe are actually
referenced by any binary code, and these are also used to censor chat messages. The
other unused keywords may correspond to presently unused categories as we saw
with the downloaded keywords.

4.2.3

9158 Censorship

9158 6.9 is installed with two lists of keywords, filnick.xml and filter.xml.
Although these XML files self-identify as being GB2312-encoded, they are really
GB18030-encoded. The former list is used to replace sensitive keywords with asterisks in user names, whereas the latter list is used to replace sensitive keywords with
asterisks in both outgoing and incoming chat messages. Updates to the latter list
are also downloaded from the following URL:

http://mimtenroom.9158.com/web9158/filter.zip

The filter.xml file also includes a version number of the list, which is an integer
in the hundreds that we have found to increase by a few every time the list is
updated. The version number of the list installed with the program, however, is
greater than the version number in any of the updates we have seen offered for
download, suggesting that the sequence may have reset or forked at some point.
In addition to keyword censorship, we found that if a chat message contains six or
more English alphabet letters, then all of its English alphabet letters are asterisked
out. The intent of this filtering is not clear. Aside from stifling English conversation,
this may be intended to filter out URLs. Given that their keyword lists filter keywords
like http, www, and com, it would seem they intend to filter all URLs.
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Keyword List

Keywords Unique

YY Finance

48

18

YY Normal

20

20

13,482

13,242

9158 Nick

65

59

9158 Chat

318

318

Sina Show SinaShow.exe

1,224

910

Sina Show UCClient.dll

910

910

3,711

3,206

58

58

YY High

Sina Show Downloaded
GuaGua

Table 4.2: Keyword list size (May 17, 2015)

4.2.4

GuaGua Censorship

GuaGua 6.2.38 has keywords built into RuleCenterPlug.dll. These keywords appear in plain text, GBK-encoded. Any outgoing message containing one of these
keywords is never sent and the following warning message is displayed in the chat
window: “消息发送失败,含有违法或不文明字符！” (Failed to send message; it may
contain illegal or uncivilized words!) GuaGua does not filter incoming messages.

4.3

Keyword Analysis

In this section, we perform a similarity comparison between the live streaming keyword lists and blacklists from other products. We then categorize the keywords on
each live streaming list according to high level themes. Finally, we track changes
to the live streaming lists over a period of 16 months and analyze which events or
topics these changes are in response to.
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Skype 3.6 DL
Skype 4.0 DL
Skype 5.5 Surveil
Sina Show Builtin
Sina Show UC
Sina UC DL 3
Sina UC DL 4
Sina UC Builtin 1
Sina UC DL 1
Sina UC Builtin 2
Sina UC DL 2
YY Normal
Sina UC DL 5
YY High
Sina Show DL
9158 Chat
LINE
Skype 5.0 DL
Skype 5.1 Surveil
Skype 3.6 Builtin
Skype 5.0 Builtin
Sina UC Builtin 3
Sina UC Builtin 4
Sina UC Builtin 5
9158 Nicknames
GuaGua

GuaGua
9158 Nicknames
Sina UC Builtin 5
Sina UC Builtin 4
Sina UC Builtin 3
Skype 5.0 Builtin
Skype 3.6 Builtin
Skype 5.1 Surveil
Skype 5.0 DL
LINE
9158 Chat
Sina Show DL
YY High
Sina UC DL 5
YY Normal
Sina UC DL 2
Sina UC Builtin 2
Sina UC DL 1
Sina UC Builtin 1
Sina UC DL 4
Sina UC DL 3
Sina Show UC
Sina Show Builtin
Skype 5.5 Surveil
Skype 4.0 DL
Skype 3.6 DL

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

Figure 4.1: Keyword lists clustered by Jaccard similarity

4.3.1

Similarity Comparison Across Keyword Lists

The live streaming keyword lists vary significantly with respect to size. The YY
High list is the largest live streaming list, whereas, if we exclude YY’s smaller lists,
GuaGua’s list is the smallest. See Table 4.2 for a summary of the size of each live
streaming list. When including TOM-Skype and Sina UC lists and the latest list
from LINE [61], we have a dataset consisting of 42 lists, which together contain
17,547 unique keywords. The lists range in size from 20 to 13,244 unique keywords.
In Figure 4.1, using the centroid linkage method [103], we hierarchically cluster
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Skype 3.6 DL
Skype 4.0 DL
Skype 5.5 Surveil
Skype 5.0 DL
Skype 5.1 Surveil
Sina UC DL 4
Sina UC DL 5
Sina UC Builtin 3
Sina UC DL 3
Sina UC Builtin 4
Sina UC Builtin 5
Sina Show DL
Sina UC Builtin 2
Sina UC DL 2
Sina UC Builtin 1
Sina UC DL 1
9158 Nicknames
GuaGua
Sina Show Builtin
Sina Show UC
YY Normal
9158 Chat
YY High
LINE
Skype 3.6 Builtin
Skype 5.0 Builtin

Skype 5.0 Builtin
Skype 3.6 Builtin
LINE
YY High
9158 Chat
YY Normal
Sina Show UC
Sina Show Builtin
GuaGua
9158 Nicknames
Sina UC DL 1
Sina UC Builtin 1
Sina UC DL 2
Sina UC Builtin 2
Sina Show DL
Sina UC Builtin 5
Sina UC Builtin 4
Sina UC DL 3
Sina UC Builtin 3
Sina UC DL 5
Sina UC DL 4
Skype 5.1 Surveil
Skype 5.0 DL
Skype 5.5 Surveil
Skype 4.0 DL
Skype 3.6 DL
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0.5
0.4
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0.0

Figure 4.2: Keyword lists clustered by Intersection over Smallest

the live streaming keyword lists along with TOM-Skype, Sina UC, and LINE by the
Jaccard similarity coefficient, also known as the Intersection over Union metric, by
computing
J(A, B) =

|A ∩ B|
.
|A ∪ B|

Using this method, we find very little similarity between lists, and when lists are
similar they are lists within the same company.
In Figure 4.2, we cluster the same keyword lists using a different similarity metric
we call the Intersection over Smallest metric. We compute list A’s similarity to B
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Theme

Example Categories

Event

Scheduled events, current events

Political

Communist Party of China, ethnic groups

People

Government officials, dissidents

Social

Gambling, prurient interests

Technology URLs, apps
Misc

No clear context

Table 4.3: Content themes and related categories

as max(% of A in B, % of B in A). The intuition behind this metric is that it would
tease out lists that inherit from other lists. We call this metric Intersection over
Smallest because it is equivalent to computing
IoS(A, B) =

|A ∩ B|
.
min(|A|, |B|)

Although using this method we see more lists similar to each other within companies,
lists from different companies remain mostly dissimilar with one exception: GuaGua
is similar to many Sina Show lists. Closer inspection reveals that the GuaGua list is
a near exact duplicate of a 2004-era list built into Sina UC that Sina Show’s built-in
lists build upon. The only difference in the GuaGua list is the addition of a single
keyword. Both of the founders of GuaGua formerly worked on audio chat software
at Langma UC (acquired by Sina Corporation in 2004 to become Sina UC) and
Sina [20]. This employment history may explain why the GuaGua and Sina lists are
so similar.

4.3.2

Keyword Content Analysis

We used a combination of machine and human translation to translate any Chinese
keywords in the live streaming dataset to English, and then we analyzed the context
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Political
Social
People

YY
Sina Show
9158

Events

GuaGua

Tech
Misc
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

Figure 4.3: Breakdown of list source by theme

behind each one. Based on these translations and contextual information three
researchers coded each keyword into one of six general themes based on the code
book developed in the previous chapter (see Table 4.3). We performed interrater
reliability checks throughout the categorization process.
Figure 4.3 shows for each of the four platforms the percentage of its blacklisted
keywords that fall into each theme. Keywords related to the social, political, and
people themes are the most common across all four platforms.
Keywords were typically either Chinese, English, or both; however, we found
that 0.5% of the YY High list are Uyghur keywords in Arabic script, which we had
not seen in our earlier work. They include references to terrorism and Islam. For
example:
ﭘﺎﺭﺗﻠﯩﻘﯘﭺ ﻳﺎﺳﺎﺵ ﺩﻩﺭﺳﻠﯩﻜﻰ
which is a Uyghur phrase that translates to “instructions to create explosives.” The
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Sina
Show
YY

9158
1 Jul, 15

1 Sep, 15

1 Nov, 15

1 Jan, 16

1 Mar, 16

1 May, 16

1 Jul, 16

1 Sep, 16

Figure 4.4: Distribution of keyword updates between May 18 2015 and
September 30 2016 (Universal Standard Time)

Platform

New keywords

YY

1,468
∗

Sina Show
9158

266
310

Table 4.4: Keywords added by platform. ∗ The total for Sina Show is 1,239 when
including strings of numbers that we suspect are primarily phone numbers, which we
excluded from our analysis.

focus on Uyghur related content relative to previously available keyword lists may
have been motivated by a June 2014 government campaign to censor terrorist content
following attacks in the Xinjiang region. Thirty Chinese Internet companies signed
a “letter of commitment” to block such content [21].

4.3.3

Keyword List Changes

In this section, we analyze changes occurring to keyword lists between May 18, 2015
to September 30, 2016. Over this collection period, we downloaded YY, Sina Show,
and 9158 lists hourly. (GuaGua does not download updates to its keyword list, and
so it is not analyzed in this section.)
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Metric

9158 vs. YY vs.
YY vs.
Sina Show
9158 Sina Show

Jaccard similarity

17.28%

1.21%

0%

Intersection over Smallest

41.56%

4.02%

0%

Table 4.5: Additions to keyword lists compared by Jaccard similarity and
by Intersection over Smallest

We collected a total of 2,044 additional keywords. Table 4.4 provides a breakdown
of unique keywords added by each application since May 18, 2015, excluding any
keywords we had already seen on that platform up until that date.
While YY added the most new keywords, Sina Show had more frequent updates
to keyword lists (158 updates) compared to YY (138 updates) and 9158 (33 updates).
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of updates over the collection period by each application. Sina Show changed the URL of their keyword list download in an updated
version the client, and as a consequence we have no data for the first three months
of Sina Show updates until we discovered the new URL.
Analyzing similarity in unique keywords between the lists extracted from YY,
Sina Show, and 9158 between May 2015 and September 2016 reveals limited overlap
between the companies (YY and Tian Ge), but does show commonalities between
Sina Show and 9158.
In Table 4.5, we compare the additions made to the keyword lists according
to their Jaccard similarity coefficient. The results are very little to no overlap in
keyword list between YY and 9158, and YY and Sina Show, with some commonalities
between 9158 and Sina Show. We also compare additions to the keyword lists using
the Intersection over Smallest metric. This metric further confirms our previous
result showing greater overlap between 9158 and Sina Show, and limited overlap to
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Theme
Social

Client

YY
Sina Show
9158
YY
Event
Sina Show
9158
YY
Political
Sina Show
9158
Technology YY
Sina Show
9158
YY
People
Sina Show
9158
YY
Misc
Sina Show
9158

44%
59%
50%
35%
10%
10%
13%
19%
21%
4%
3%
13%
3%
4%
4%
1%
5%
3%

Figure 4.5: Distribution of themes across three live streaming platforms

YY, over time.
The overlap between Sina Show and 9158 is not surprising since the platforms are
owned by the same company. Despite this common ownership and degree of similarity
the keyword lists and timing of list updates are not identical, which suggests Tian
Ge does not manage content on the platforms in completely the same way.

4.3.4

Content Analysis of Keyword Additions

We analyzed each of the keyword additions to the live streaming keyword lists,
categorizing them into the same high level themes as the other keywords; however,
this time we also broke each theme down into smaller sub-categories. Figure 4.5
shows for each of the three applications what percentage of the additional blacklisted
keywords belong to each theme. In the following sections, we provide descriptive
statistics describing the keyword content and examine each theme in detail.
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Theme
Social

Category Client
Illicit
Goods
Prurient

Gambling

YY
Sina Show
9158
YY
Sina Show
9158
YY
Sina Show

26.8%
96.2%
95.2%
72.8%
3.3%
4.8%
0.4%
0.5%

Figure 4.6: Percentage of Social theme keywords by category

Social Theme
The Social theme is divided into three categories: gambling (e.g., online casinos),
illicit goods and services (e.g., narcotics, weapons, counterfeit products), and prurient
interests (e.g., sexuality, pornography, prostitution). Figure 4.6 shows the percentage
of Social theme keywords by category.
The Social theme accounts for the highest percentage of keywords added to each
application relative to other themes (Sina Show: 59%, 9158: 50%, YY: 44%). The
focus on this theme may reflect a reaction of companies to the new regulatory campaigns that specifically target pornography, drugs, and weapons.

Event Theme
The Event theme includes reference to 20 distinct events in keywords added to the
applications’ keyword lists. We correlate the timing of keyword list updates to events
that happened within our collecton period and find reactive censorship driven by
current events.
Reporting on current events in China is tightly controlled by government authorities. Media organizations are routinely provided directives on how to report
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Theme Category
Client
Event Tiananmen Square YY
Sina Show
9158
Zhou Yongkang
YY
sentence
Sina Show
9158
Ezubao
Sina Show
9158
Oscars 2016
Sina Show
9158
Dai Jianyong Arrest Sina Show
9158
ISIS Crisis
Sina Show
9158
Tianjin Explosion
9158
South China Sea
YY
Sina Show
9158
Cultural Revolution YY
Sina Show
G20
YY
Hong Kong Localist YY
Jingwen incident
YY
YY sex video
YY
Wukan
YY
Occupy movement YY
Tian Guo Band
YY
HK Booksellers
YY
Paris attacks
YY
Deshun Release
YY
Support Cantonese YY

83.1%
9.7%
9.1%
4.3%
19.4%
18.2%
25.8%
24.2%
16.1%
15.2%
12.9%
12.1%
6.5%
9.1%
9.1%
0.3%
6.5%
3.0%
5.1%
3.2%
2.7%
0.9%
0.9%
0.9%
0.5%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%

Figure 4.7: Percentage of Event theme keywords by category

the news. China Digital Times, an independent media group, occasionally publishes
leaked directives sent to Chinese news organizations, which provide a glimpse into
how this system works [54]. There have also been leaks from social media companies,
such as Sina Weibo, which describe censorship instructions from company managers
that purportedly correspond to state directives [58]. However, it is unclear in what
form or at what frequency directives are provided and if companies receive the same

72

Chapter 4. Censorship in Live Streaming Platforms

Metric

9158 vs. YY vs.
Sina Show
9158

YY vs.
Sina Show

Jaccard similarity

73.52%

0%

0%

Intersection over Smallest

92.59%

0%

0%

Table 4.6: Keyword additions to Event theme in three live streaming platforms compared by Jaccard similarity and by Intersection over Smallest

ones.
YY added the largest number of event related keywords (632 keywords) compared
to 9158 (33 keywords) and Sina Show (31 keywords). YY also referenced in its
additions more unique events (15) than 9158 (8) or Sina Show (8).
In Table 4.6, we compare the additions of event-related keywords across the platforms by Jaccard similarity and our similarity metric. Our results show no overlap in
additional event keywords referenced between YY and Tian Ge operated applications,
which suggests there are either no common directives provided to these companies
or there is varying compliance with directives. However, we do see close similarity
between Sina Show and 9158 Event keywords, most likely due to their shared parent
company.
Only three events are referenced by all applications in keyword additions (June 4
1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the sentencing of Zhou Yongkang, and the Hague
Verdict on the South China Sea arbitration).
In keyword additions, Sina Show and 9158 reference the same seven events. The
only difference between them is 9158 references the Tianjin Explosion and Sina Show
references the Cultural Revolution. Event updates on the two applications are often
made within the same period and sometimes on the same day. The close similarities
between these applications can explained by common ownership. However, the lack
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of overlap in event-related keywords between the platforms shows they still do not
share an identical list. Below we examine the three events that all three applications
did reference.
The June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre remains one of the most taboo
events in China. Reactive censorship on social media in China often accompanies the
anniversary [50], and the Chinese government continues to push revisionist narratives
of what happened.
Between late May and the first week of June 2015, leading up to the 27th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, YY added 525 keywords related to the
event. Comparatively, 9158 and Sina Show each added three keywords on dates that
did not fall close to the anniversary.
At the start of our data collection period, YY keyword lists already had a heavy
focus on June 4, accounting for over 90% of YY’s event keywords and 32% of YY’s
lists overall. June 4 related keywords on YY’s lists include a number of ways to refer
to the event including numerals (“89VIIV”); homonyms (陆4, “Land 4,” the character
(陆 Lù) sounds similar to six (六 Liù) in Chinese); locations of annual memorial
events (维园烛光, “Victoria Park Candle”); and references to recent discussion of
the event such as “Trump June 4” (川普六四), which is likely related to Donald
Trump referring to Tiananmen Square as a “riot” in an election debate.
On June 11 2015, Zhou Yongkang, who was once one of China’s most powerful
political figures, was sentenced to life in prison on corruption charges [131]. On
June 11, YY added 23 keywords related to the sentencing (e.g., 無 期 徒 刑 “life
imprisonment”). Prior to the date of the sentencing, Sina Show and 9158 added
references to associates of Zhou who were also implicated in his corruption case
including former People’s Liberation Army general Xu Caihou (徐才厚) and former
Party official Ling Jihua (令计划).
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In a case known as the South China Sea Arbitration, the Philippines under provisions of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea brought complaints
against China over territorial claims in the South China Sea [127].
On July 12, 2016, an international tribunal in the Hague ruled in favor of the
Philippines and concluded that China has no legal basis to claim historical rights in
the South China Sea [104]. China rejected the ruling. On the same day, Sina Show
added two keywords (南海仲裁 “South China Sea Arbitration”, 海牙 “Hague”) and
9158 added one (南海仲裁 “South China Sea Arbitration”). On July 13, YY added
two keywords, one referencing China’s rejection of the ruling (习总的拒绝 “President
Xi’s rejection”) and another related to a fake news story that went viral on Chinese
social media following the verdict, which claimed China and the Philippines had
declared war on each other and the Chinese army successfully wiped out a unit of
the Philippine Air Force (全歼菲方空军 “Wipe out the Philippine Air Force”).
YY keyword lists include reference to 11 events that do not appear on the other
applications. Some of these events are clearly sensitive topics.
Wukan is a fishing village in southern Guangdong that has earned renown for
activism. In 2016, villagers took to the streets calling for the release of detained
democratically-elected local leader Lin Zulian and the resolution of a long-simmering
dispute over land sales. China Digital Times published [51] a leaked directive that
was issued to news organizations on June 21, 2016, (China Digital Times does not
disclose the issuing bodies to protect the sources of the leaks):
“Regarding former village committee chief of Wukan, Guangdong, Lin
Zuluan being investigated and admitting his guilt, websites are strictly
prohibited from releasing or re-publishing any news, photos, video, or
information related to the mass incident in the village.”
On June 22, YY added one keyword (林 祖 銮 “Lin Zulian”) followed by the
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addition of two keywords on June 23 (林祖戀 “Lin Zulian,” 還我書記 “Return our
secretary”). It is unclear if YY received similar directives for handling the Wukan
protests. While it is plausible, the lack of any Wukan-related keywords on Sina Show
or 9158 suggests distribution of these directives or compliance to them varies.
We observe a similar pattern in the censorship of President Xi’s gaffe during his
opening speech at the 2016 G20 summit in Hangzhou [79]. During the September
4, 2016 speech Xi mistakenly said “reduce taxes and make roads easy [to travel on],
facilitate commerce and loosen clothing” (轻关易道通商宽衣), when he should have
read “reduce taxes and make roads easy [to travel on], facilitate commerce and be
lenient to farmers” (轻关易道通商宽农).
This slip of the tongue was clearly embarrassing for Xi. China Digital Times
published a September 4 leaked directive that instructed online media to “filter and
intercept content” related to “tongshang kuannong [通商宽农],” and strictly delete
comments, photos, videos, and “related information” [52]. On September 5, YY
added 17 keywords including “Xi undress” (習寬衣), “loosen the clothing and undo
the belt” (寬衣解帶), and other references to the speech. However, Sina Show and
9158 did not add keywords related to this event.
Events like the Wukan protest and G20 speech gaffe are clearly sensitive to Chinese authorities, and it is surprising to see them only referenced on one application.
Other keywords added by YY are related to sensitive events specific to the application. In September 2015, YY added 6 keywords referencing an August 2015 incident
during which a YY user apparently forgot to turn off her webcam and had sex with
her partner while live streaming (yy出事视频 “yy accident video,” 忘关视频被啪
“forgot to turn off the video while having sex”). Videos of the incident circulated on
Chinese social media causing a scandal. In this case, it is obvious that YY would
be motivated to attempt damage control over the incident as it brings unwanted
attention from authorities.
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Overall, we find that censorship of events is dynamic and reactive. However,
we observe a lack of overlap in the unique events censored by different companies
suggesting that there are no centralized directives given to companies or differing
levels of compliance. YY is registered in Guangzhou whereas Tian Ge is registered
in Hangzhou. Each company has to follow respective municipal and provincial regulations. The companies may therefore be given different directives based on the
location of their registration, which other studies have suggested may account for
variance in how censorship is implemented. These results demonstrate that events
are catalysts for censorship but the ways in which they are managed is not uniform.

Political Theme
The Political theme includes 18 categories related to issues including the Communist
Party of China (CPC), ethnic minority groups in China, religious movements, and
terrorism.
All three applications added keywords related to the CPC. This includes general
references to the structure of the party and its various departments (e.g., 中 央
政治局 “politburo,” 中共中央 “CPC Central Committee”); allusions to factional
struggles within the party (e.g, 习近平阵营和江派 “Xi and Jiang faction camp”);
and pejoratives (e.g., 共匪 “Communist bandits”).
Keywords related to the Uyghur ethnic minority were also added by all of the
applications. These keywords appear in Chinese and in the Uyghur language in both
Arabic and Latin script. The content of other Uyghur-related keywords range from
religion (东 突 穆 斯 林 “East Turkestan Muslim”), violence (partila “explode”), to
separatism (“Turkestan Islamic Party,” an Islamic separatist organization founded
by Uyghur militants). Other keywords are more cryptic without clear context such
as Uyghur words for “cloudy weather” and “sweet potato.”
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Theme Category
Political Uyghur

Client

YY
Sina Show
9158
Banned Books
YY
Sina Show
9158
Terrorism
YY
Sina Show
9158
Falun Gong
YY
Tibet
Sina Show
9158
Islam
YY
Sina Show
9158
CPC Criticism
YY
Sina Show
CPC General
YY
Sina Show
9158
Huazang Dharama YY
Corruption
YY
Sina Show
9158
Charter 08
YY
Sina Show
Petitioning
Sina Show
9158
Media
Sina Show
Hong Kong
9158
Human Rights
YY
Military
YY
Censorship
YY

35.7%
32.8%
14.5%
0.9%
3.4%
40.6%
11.6%
32.8%
14.5%
10.3%
0.9%
5.2%
9.4%
4.0%
1.7%
1.3%
3.4%
2.7%
1.7%

Figure 4.8: Percentage of Political theme keywords by category

Titles of books dealing with sensitive topics that have been banned in China
also appear on each application. These books, predominantly published in Hong
Kong and Taiwan include discussions of power struggles within the CPC (e.g., 老
江气杀习大, “Old Jiang Enrages Uncle Xi”), and fiction critical of communist rule
(e.g., 黄祸, “Yellow Peril” written by Wang Lixiong). China has strict regulations
on the publishing industry [126], pushing dissident and tabloid authors to Hong
Kong and Taiwan to publish on sensitive topics. The sale of banned books was
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Theme
Tech

Category

Client

Circumvention

YY
11%
Sina Show
60%
9158
28%
URL
YY
42%
Sina Show
40%
9158
28%
Chinese
YY
36%
Software
9158
12%
Hardware
YY
7%
9158
33%
Phone Numbers YY
4%

Figure 4.9: Percentage of Technology theme keywords by category

highlighted in 2015 after five employees of a book shop and publishing firm in Hong
Kong specializing in taboo titles went missing, only to later emerge in custody in
mainland China. Their disappearances had a chilling effect on publishers in Hong
Kong who pulled sensitive titles from their shelves [125]. One of the booksellers,
Lam Wing-kee, revealed details of his detention at a press conference in Hong Kong
on June 16, 2016. His name (林荣基) is included in the keywords lists on YY under
the event theme.

Technology Theme

The technology theme has five categories including censorship circumvention tools,
URLs, hardware devices, Chinese software and websites, and phone numbers.
The hardware category includes 25 references to drones and other unmanned
aircraft (e.g, 四旋翼无人机 “quadcopter”;). While it is unclear why these keywords
are censored, there is rising concern in China regarding safety, privacy, national
security issues and increasing regulations on drone technology [66].
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Theme
People

Category Client
Gov official YY
Sina Show
9158
Dissident YY
Sina Show
9158

40%
79%
85%
60%
21%
15%

Figure 4.10: Percentage of People theme keywords by category

In the “Chinese websites and software” category we see instances of what may
be companies using censorship to gain competitive advantage. YY lists include 25
keywords that reference competing live streaming services in China (e.g., 美拍直播,
“Mei Pai Live,” 熊猫TV, “Panda TV”), and 9158 includes two keywords (e.g., 六间
房 “Six Room”). The addition of these keywords may be attempts to prevent users
from being lured away from the provider’s platform.

People Theme
The People theme includes two categories: names of CPC officials and names of
dissidents.References to dissidents include the renowned artist Ai WeiWei (艾未未),
Chinese human rights lawyer Guo Feixiong (郭飛雄), and gender activist Ye Haiyan
(referred to by her nickname “rogue yan” 流氓燕).
References to officials includes current and former leaders (e.g., 李克强 “Li Keqiang” current Premier of the State Council of China, 胡锦涛 “Hu Jintao” former
Chinese President).
There are also numerous examples of playful, derogatory, and creative ways to
refer to party leaders in the keyword lists. Keywords related to President Xi Jinping
include an endearing nickname, “Daddy Xi” or “Uncle Xi” (习大大), which has been
used in state propaganda [34], but recently has been reportedly banned from official
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use to tone down Xi’s populist image [31]. Other nicknames are more derogatory
such as “Bun Ruthless” (包子心狠手辣). The word steamed bun (包子) is used
to refer to Xi following the circulation of a photo showing him ordering lunch at a
steamed bun shop that was subsequently criticized as a political show [48]. Whereas
“ruthless” (心狠手辣) criticizes Xi’s hardline rule over China. Chinese netizens often
make creative use of the Chinese language in efforts to evade censorship [49]. We see
examples of this practice in reference to Xi by reversing the order of the characters in
his name (平近习), and using homoglyphs (刁近乎, diāo jín hū) that appear similar
to his characters (习近平, xí jìn píng).
Researchers have argued that automated keyword censorship is ineffective, because through creative use of language users find means to circumvent the filters [89].
The keyword lists we collected show that censors are clearly picking up on these practices, engaged in a cat and mouse game between users. The censors will never be able
to comprehensively censor speech through keyword filtering, nor will users always be
able to evade these controls.

4.4

Conclusion

Our earlier work studying instant messaging apps found inconsistencies in client-side
keyword filtering. However, the work was limited to a small number of applications
that were not very representative in terms of usage numbers. In this chapter, we
confirmed these earlier findings by analyzing the keyword lists of much more popular
applications, the top applications of an industry segment.
We reverse engineered the top four live streaming applications, finding a total
of 17,547 unique keywords that trigger these applications to censor or surveil. We
combined this dataset with our earlier data obtained by analyzing instant messaging
apps in Chapter 3. After cross-comparing these lists, we found very little consistency
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in what each app censored with the exception of apps that shared parent companies
or the case of GuaGua being founded by former Sina employees who seemingly took
with them the list Sina was known to be using at the time they left the company.
The inconsistencies we found between keyword lists extend beyond the exact
keywords each app censors. They also exist when we examined over time which
topics each list was updated to censor. Over a period of 16 months, we found
that apps without shared parent companies rarely updated their lists in response
to the same topics or events. The lack of any large amount of consistency between
these keyword lists demonstrates that the content of these lists cannot be largely
the result of common directives received from a shared source such as the central
Chinese government.
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Censorship in Mobile Games
In this chapter we describe the censorship and surveillance mechanisms built into
Chinese mobile games. We analyzed over 200 games, including both games developed
in China and international games adapted for the Chinese market. We discovered
over 250 keyword lists and 183,111 unique keywords overall.
The results from previous chapters suggest that keyword lists that different companies use to perform censorship have little overlap. This suggests that these lists are
not from some central source such as the Chinese government. But other work, such
as by Mackinnon [98] and “Mr. Tao” [102], has hypothesized that city or provincial
authorities may play a larger role in determining what to censor than those from the
central Chinese government.
To further investigate these hypotheses we looked at the Chinese mobile gaming
industry, which has recently come under increased government pressure [55, 144].
We found a large number of games implement keyword censorship client-side, which
provided the opportunity to collect hundreds of keyword blacklists. Facilitated by
the large number of keyword lists, we analyzed the similarity between them and
assessed four new hypotheses for how the lists are created: (1) Content directives
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are determined at the city or provincial level and may vary depending on where
companies are based; (2) Content directives are determined for specific genres of
games; (3) Content directives are related to the date that games are approved by
regulators; (4) Companies are under general regulatory pressures, but have a degree
of flexibility in determining which specific content to block.
We summarize our major contributions as follows:

1. We analyze over 250 keyword lists collected from over 200 games together
comprising 183,111 unique keywords.
2. We present a novel application of a statistical technique and use it to test for
correlation between keyword list similarity and other features in games such as
whether they share the same publisher or developer.
3. We show that Chinese companies generating keyword lists themselves is the
only plausible explanation for similarity between certain keyword lists among
all of the hypotheses we tested.

5.1 Background
With an estimated value of over 27.5 billion US$ in 2017 [101], China represents
the largest gaming market in the world. Lucrative as it is, China’s market presents
unique challenges to companies due to its strict regulatory environment. In 2010
China’s Ministry of Culture (MOC) published a regulation [55] listing a number of
prohibited topics for online games:

“violating basic principles set by the Constitution; jeopardizing national
unity, state sovereignty and territorial integrity; leaking state secrets,
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endangering state security or damaging state honor and interests; instigating ethnic hatred or discrimination, jeopardizing ethnic unity, and
infringing ethnic rituals or customs; promoting heretical or superstitious
ideas; spreading rumors, disrupting social order and stability; disseminating obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence or abetting crime;
humiliating or slandering others, infringing the lawful rights of others;
transgressing social morality; and other contents forbidden by laws and
administrative regulations.”

The vague definitions of prohibited topics make it unclear how to stay within the
line and have been called “pocket crimes” (口袋罪), because anything can fit into
them [144].
On June 2, 2016, China Audio-video and Digital Publishing Association, a nongovernmental organization established in 1994, suggested a list of topics to be filtered
on mobile games, including “attacking leaders of the Community Party of China
(CPC)”, “opposing Maoism”, “referring to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau as an
independent country”. No specific keywords are listed in the document [18].
Games released in China require registration approval from MOC and a publication license from China’s State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film
and Television (SAPPRFT). In May 2016, SAPPRFT extended the requirement
to China’s fast-growing mobile gaming industry. Games without a license will be
removed from app stores. Previously, authorization from SAPPRFT was not mandated for individual games as long as the operators registered the games with the
MOC within 30 days of publication [124]. In line with the new regulations, Apple
Inc. notified all developers in mainland China that they would need to submit the
approval number issued by SAPPRFT to list a game in the iTunes App Store.
Both high-level game content such as the story line and low-level content including
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all scripts and conversations are subject to content controls [77, 25]. To ensure
compliance with China’s laws and regulations, gaming companies manage content
by enabling keyword filtering systems on their products. Keyword filtering may
be enabled to block content in chat features or to prevent players from creating
user names and scoreboards containing sensitive keywords. To obtain a publication
number for a game, the applicant must submit a list of blocked keywords enabled
in the game and administrative accounts for regulators to test and review all scripts
and features in the game [123]. In addition to content censorship, since August
1, 2016, Chinese mobile application developers are required to give the Cyberspace
Administration of China (CAC) access to basic user information, which must be
verified with a user’s mobile phone number or real identification.

5.2 Methodology
Our analysis of keyword censorship in Chinese mobile games consists of two experiments. First, we collected the top games from a popular Chinese app store to
evaluate which variables best predict the similarity between any two games’ censored keyword lists. In the second experiment, we analyzed games from top Chinese
game publishers and developers to further explore how well the “same publisher” and
“same developer” variables predict keyword list similarity.

5.2.1

Analyzing Highly Downloaded Games

To understand which commonalities between games best predict the similarity of
those games’ keyword lists, we collected a variety of popular Chinese games. First,
in December 2016, we acquired games from a Top 20 list of games for November
2016 [10] compiled by Newzoo, a gaming market analytics company. We also acquired
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games from the earliest month Newzoo had a Top 20 list for, October 2014 [9]. In
March 2017, to expand the collection of games, we collected highly downloaded games
from Hi Market (安卓市场) [17], a popular [11] app store owned by Baidu [64]. We
downloaded games from the site by scraping the first 500 search results from a search
query we designed to restrict the results to “Chinese” games with over two million
downloads and a rating of 4 to 5 stars. We repeated the process again for what
the site termed “English” games, which consisted more broadly of all international
games that generally had been adapted to meet Chinese regulations. (Our search
queries were not designed to include games with exactly five stars as those tended to
be games with very few reviews.) Together these methods produced a total of 836
unique games.
We then analyzed the games. Since there were too many games to reverse engineer each by hand, we first automatically searched for strings in the games to narrow
down which warranted closer analysis and reverse engineering effort. We searched
for sensitive words including “falun”, “法轮” (Falun), “fuck”, and “肏” (fuck), and
general words or partial word stems that based on experience in previous work we
expected to find in program code implementing censorship specifically, blacklist,
censor, dirty, filter, forbid, illegal, keyword, profan, and sensitiv. We
then manually reviewed the search results, collecting obvious blacklists, and manually reverse engineering games that appeared to implement censorship but where the
blacklists were not immediately apparent, such as if the blacklists were obfuscated
or encrypted. Using this method, we found keyword lists in a variety of formats,
including text formats such as plain text, XML, JSON; binary formats such as compiled Lua or C++ code; and in files encrypted with a variety of different algorithms
that required reverse engineering to decrypt.
We next tested which commonalities between two games best explained the similarity of those games’ keyword lists. The commonalities we tested were whether two
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games had the same publisher city, same publisher province, same developer city,
same developer province, same genre, same publisher, same developer, or similar
approval date. For the publisher and developer city, if a publisher or developer had
offices in multiple cities, we used the city that they were primarily headquartered in.
For genre and approval date, we used the genre and approval date under which the
game was approved by the MOC [15].
To test for correlation between each of these commonalities and keyword list
similarity, we used a statistical test called a partial Mantel test [121, 96], an extension
of the Mantel Test [99]. A Mantel test is a statistical test for the presence of Pearson
correlation between two similarity or distance matrices, a response variable Y and
a potential explanatory variable X. The result of this test is the Mantel r statistic.
The r statistic is related to the Mantel z statistic,

z=

n−1 ∑
n
∑

Xij Yij

i=1 j=i+1

except standardized by the variances of both matrices to be between -1 and 1, where
the closer r is to -1, the more negative correlation exists, and the closer to 1, the
more positive correlation exists (see [96]). The Mantel test also provides a method
for computing the test statistic’s p value, the probability that at least as extreme
of correlation could have occurred by chance, using a Monte Carlo test method. A
partial Mantel test extends the Mantel test by being able to control for additional
matrices Z1 , Z2 , . . ..
To create our response variable Y representing keyword list similarity, we first
vectorize each list by creating a count vector v with dimension equal to the total #
of unique keywords we have seen across all lists and where vk is the # of times the
kth word in our dataset appears in that list, which in our dataset could be greater
than one. Then we define Yij as the cosine similarity between the ith list’s count
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vector u and the jth list’s count vector v, i.e.,
∑n
ui vi
u·v
√ ∑n
C(u, v) =
= √∑n i=1
.
2
2
∥u∥2 ∥v∥2
i=1 ui
i=1 vi
Geometrically, the cosine similarity is the cosine of the angle between two vectors.
In the previous chapter, we compared lists by using two different metrics. By
considering each list as a set of keywords, we compared two lists by computing the
Jaccard similarity (also known as the Intersection over Union metric), i.e.,
J(A, B) =

|A ∩ B|
,
|A ∪ B|

and computing the Intersection over Smallest metric, i.e.,
IoS(A, B) =

|A ∩ B|
.
min(|A|, |B|)

The advantage of the Intersection over Smallest metric was that it teases out relationships between lists, such as when one large list entirely contains a small list,
that might otherwise be obscured by Jaccard similarity. However, the disadvantage
of Intersection over Smallest is that very small lists comprised of a lot of very common words are very similar to most large lists, even though there is no interesting
relationship between these lists.
The cosine similarity metric can be seen as striking a compromise between Jaccard
similarity and Intersection over Smallest. If A and B are the corresponding keyword
sets for count vectors u and v, respectively, then, if every keyword appears in each
list at most once (keywords in our dataset rarely appear more than once in the same
list), then the cosine similarity between u and v is identical to computing
|A ∩ B|
C(u, v) = √ √ .
|A| |B|
When |A| < |B|, if B acquires n new words, each of them not in A, then, with
Jaccard similarity, the metric decreases by a factor of 1 + n/|B|, in Intersection
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over Smallest, the metric does not decrease (i.e., decreases by a factor of 1), but
√
with cosine similarity, the denominator decreases by a factor of 1 + n/|B|, striking
middle ground between 1 + n/|B| and 1. Thus, the choice of cosine similarity to
compare keyword lists can be seen as partially having both the advantages of Jaccard
similarity and Intersection over Smallest.
With the response variable Y defined as a cosine similarity matrix between each
of the lists, we must still define X, the matrix we will test for correlation with Y .
Depending on the variable that we wish to test for correlation with Y , we define
X differently. For all but the test of nearby approval dates, X is a binary matrix
where Xij is one if and only if the ith list has a property in common with (e.g., if
common publishers is being tested, then has the same publisher as) the jth. For
testing nearby approval dates, we first construct X as the matrix such that Xij is
the distance between the ith and jth lists’ approval dates as measured in days. We
then normalize the matrix by dividing by X’s largest value, and then add −1 to each
value to turn it into a similarity matrix.
We often observed multiple lists included in each game. Some games used separate
lists for censoring different features of the game. Other games seemed to accidentally
include an older, outdated version of a list. As the partial Mantel test allows us to
control for variables, in each of our tests we control for a binary matrix Z where Zij
is one if and only if the ith list is from the same game than the jth.

5.2.2

Analyzing Games from Popular Publishers and Developers

During April 2017, after observing the results from the last experiment (see Section 5.3.1), we noticed that many games did not share a publisher or developer with
any other game. We decided to perform another experiment focusing on further
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testing the correlation between games’ keyword list similarity and games with the
same developers and publishers. In this experiment, we specifically look at the games
from five popular publishers and seven popular developers to increase the number of
games that share the same publisher or developer.
To determine the list of publishers, we returned to the November 2016 Top 20
list [10] and looked at all publishers from this list who both appeared in the Top 20
list and in whose games we had previously found at least one blacklist. This search
resulted in us looking at Giant Interactive Group Inc. (巨人网络科技有限公司),
Happy Elements (乐元素游戏), iDreamSky Technology Ltd. (乐逗游戏), NetEase
(网易), and Tencent (腾讯).
To find a similar list of developers, we could not immediately use the same Top
20 list as it only listed publishers and not developers. Instead, we used the data
from our previous analysis of highly downloaded games to collect the five developers who had the highest number of games containing keyword blacklists in our
analysis. Since there was a four-way tie for fourth place, this yielded seven developers: CatCap Studio (达唯科技股份有限公司), Chukong Technologies (触控科技),
Joymeng (乐堂动漫), Ourpalm Co. Ltd. (掌趣科技), Smile Games (乐人游戏), Ultralisk (雷兽互动), and Xiao Ao (小奥游戏).
We compiled a list of games for each publisher from the comprehensive list of
mobile games for which each publisher had ever successfully obtained approval from
the MOC, information available on their website [15]. We compiled a preliminary list
of games for each developer from each developer’s website and again from the MOC
website [15]. However, often it was unclear whether a game on a developer’s website
or attributed to them by the MOC was published or developed by that company, as
the MOC only provides data concerning the publisher and/or operator of a game.
To exclude such games, we obtained copyright and ownership information for games
using a tool called Tianyancha, a privately-owned platform that consolidates all
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public information of companies registered with China’s State Administration for
Industry and Commerce and relevant regulators [16].
After downloading these games for each publisher and developer, we found 341
and 240 games, respectively, and 574 unique games combined. We used the same
techniques as before to find lists in these games, and we again performed partial
Mantel tests to assess correlation between keyword list similarity and a variety of
different commonalities between games (again controlling for lists from the same
game). However, in this case, we only tested keyword list similarity with correlation
between same publisher, same developer, and nearby approval dates.

5.3 Results
In this section we describe our results from both of our experiments.

5.3.1

Results from Analyzing Highly Downloaded Games

From the 836 games that we analyzed in this experiment, we found 132 lists in 113
different games together containing 152,114 unique keywords. (This should not be interpreted to mean that other games had no censorship, as their client-side censorship
may not have been discovered by our methods or as they may have performed censorship server-side.) These lists came from a number of popular Chinese games such as
天天酷跑3D (Tiantian Dash), and popular international games adapted to comply
with Chinese regulations such as Ski Safari 2 and Candy Crush Saga. Figure 5.1
shows a heatmap of the pairwise cosine similarity of each blacklist hierarchically
clustered according to the centroid linkage method.
We performed the partial Mantel test as described in Section 5.2 testing for cor-
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Figure 5.1: Cosine similarity of blacklists from highly downloaded games
hierarchically clustered according to the centroid linkage method

relation between keyword list similarity and a number of different commonalities
between games. The results of this test are the Mantel r statistic, a measurement of
correlation between -1 and 1, and its corresponding p value, the probability that at
least as extreme of correlation could have occurred by chance. Five game commonalities tested did not show significant correlation: publisher city, −0.0097 (p = 0.60);
publisher province, −0.014 (p = 0.68); developer city, −0.0074 (p = 0.59);
developer province, −0.0037 (p = 0.55); and genre, −0.013 (p = 0.65). Three
game commonalities tested did show significant correlation: approval date, 0.16
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(p = 0.0067); publisher, 0.15 (p < 0.001); and developer, 0.17 (p < 0.001).
Since the game commonalities tested may be correlated among themselves (e.g.,
games with the same developer tend to have the same publisher), we repeated each
of the three tests two times for approval date, developer, and publisher, controlling
for first the one and then the other of whichever of the two we were not presently
testing. The greatest changes in results happened when testing same developers
controlling for same publishers, where the r statistic reduced to 0.095 (p < 0.001),
and same publishers controlling for same developers, where the r statistic reduced
to only 0.047 (p = 0.0015). This suggests that, after controlling for each other
as confounding variables, similar developers better predicts keyword similarity than
similar publishers.
Because many of the games did not share the same publisher (50%) or developer
(62%) with any of the other games we found lists from, and many others shared
very few of each, we decided to perform a second experiment looking at games from
popular publishers and developers in order to increase the number of games that
share the same publisher or developer and in order to generally confirm our results.

5.3.2

Results from Analyzing Games from Popular Publishers and Developers

From the 574 unique games that we analyzed in this experiment, we found 167 lists
in 129 different games together containing 171,150 unique keywords. This list again
includes popular Chinese (e.g., 开心消消乐 or Anipop) and international (e.g., Fruit
Ninja and Temple Run 2) games. See Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for a breakdown of lists
found from each publisher and developer. Figure 5.2 shows a heatmap of the pairwise
cosine similarity of each blacklist hierarchically clustered according to the centroid
linkage method.
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Publisher

Downloaded Lists Found

Giant

26

11

Happy Elements

11

3

iDreamSky

29

8

Netease

87

22

Tencent

188

34

Table 5.1: The number of games downloaded and lists found for each publisher

Developer

Downloaded Lists Found

CatCap

23

7

Chukong

38

10

Joymeng

63

9

Ourpalm

38

11

Smile

19

4

Ultralisk

21

16

Xiao Ao

38

32

Table 5.2: The number of games downloaded and lists found for each developer

Our partial Mantel test results for the tested game commonalities are as follows:
approval date, −0.056 (p = 0.83); publisher, 0.21 (p < 0.001); developer, 0.23
(p < 0.001).
Compared to the previous experiment, we saw even more correlation when testing
same publishers and same developers; however, we were surprised to see the correlation that we had originally seen in the first experiment when testing similar approval
dates disappear in the second, as we expected to see some correlation due to (e.g.)
developers adding to lists over time. The second experiment’s result may be because
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Figure 5.2: Cosine similarity of blacklists from games from top publishers
and developers hierarchically clustered according to the centroid linkage
method

the experiment was specifically designed to further test correlation in games with
the same publishers and developers by decreasing publisher and developer variety.
However, by focusing on these variables and decreasing variety, we may have limited
our ability to observe the effect of other explanatory variables.
We also again tested same publisher controlling for same developer and same
developer controlling for same publisher. The same publisher controlling for same
developer reduced the correlation to 0.064 (p = 0.015). The same developer con-
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Figure 5.3: For each experiment a histogram showing the number of keyword lists versus the number of keywords in that list. The x axis is
log-scaled.

trolling for same publisher only reduced the correlation to 0.13 (p < 0.001). This
indicates that, after controlling for each other as confounding variables, games having
the same developers better predicts keyword list similarity than similar publishers.
There was considerable diversity in the number of keywords found in each list.
In both experiments, most lists have fewer than 10,000 keywords (see Figure 5.3 for
the observed distributions). The shortest list seen contained 65 keywords, whereas
the longest contained 53,874.

5.4

Keyword Analysis

In this section we discuss the provenance of keyword lists and provide a preliminary
content analysis.
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5.4.1

Keyword List Provenance

Our results suggest that developers, and, to a lesser extent, publishers are largely
responsible for providing the keyword lists that come with their games; however,
while our results do not speak directly to how they accumulate these lists, there
are clues in our keyword data set that point to possible directions. Text-based data
formats typically have escape sequences used to escape otherwise special characters
that are used to structure the data. While we took care to unescape keywords from
whatever file format it was stored in, some developers did not always do so, leaving
the escape sequences in and providing clues as to where the lists were taken from.
For instance, we saw C-style escapes in other file formats, e.g., 私\\服 which we
found in an XML document with a C-style escape of the \ by preceding it with a
second \ (the keyword appears as 私\服 in many lists). Conversely, we saw XML
escapes in keywords in non-XML files such as the ampersand in 冠西&艳照 having
been replaced with &amp; resulting in 冠西&amp;艳照.
Some keywords may even trace back to originally being shared on old web apps.
For instance, old PHP web apps escaped database input by manually calling the
addslashes [3] function or by enabling “magic quotes” [4] which called it automatically. However, this functionality has long been deprecated due to it being insecure
and not multibyte character encoding aware [118]. In 2004, when a leaked keyword
list had been published on a bulletin board [19], the published list contained many
erroneous \ escapes due to the bulletin board’s improper escaping. For instance, the
list features 胡錦\濤, since the second character (錦) in the Chinese GBK encoding
encodes to the bytes 0xe5 and 0x5c, the latter byte being \ in ASCII, which the web
app erroneously interpreted as a special byte needing to be escaped and preceded it
with another \. As keywords such as this one are featured in many of our lists, this
suggests that they and potentially many others had been at one time been shared
on old web apps that had improperly escaped database input.
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Theme

Examples

Event

Anniversaries, current events

Political

Communist Party of China, religious groups

People

Government officials, dissidents

Social

Gambling, prurient interests

Technology Online games, URLs
Misc

No clear context

Table 5.3: Content themes and related categories

5.4.2

Content Analysis

Our work in previous chapters performed content analysis of keyword lists by manually grouping keywords into content categories based on contextual information.
Using similar methods, we conducted a preliminary content analysis to provide a
high level description of the data set. We analyzed a random sample of 7,000 keywords from our data set of 183,111 keywords. A native Chinese speaker reviewed the
random sample and based on the context of the keywords assigned high level themes
according to the code book developed in the previous two chapters. See Table 5.3
for a description of each theme and Figure 5.4 for the distribution of keywords by
theme. We describe and provide examples of each theme in the remainder of this
section.
Social: This theme accounted for the largest percentage of the keywords we
analyzed. Examples include references to illicit goods such as “出售业主信息数据”
(selling data information of property owners) and gambling (e.g., “六合彩” Mark Six,
a lottery betting system organized by Hong Kong Jockey Club). We found a similar
focus on Social theme keywords in live streaming apps in the previous chapter.
Political: This theme includes general references to the CPC and government
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Figure 5.4: Breakdown by theme of 7,000 randomly sampled keywords (±1.1
error at 95% confidence)

bodies (e.g., “人民检察院” People’s Procuratorate, the agency responsible for both
prosecution and investigation under China’s legal system), criticism of state policy (e.g., “敏感词屏蔽的社会”, meaning “a society where sensitive keywords are
blocked”), religion (e.g., Falun Gong and Christianity), Sino-Japanese relations, and
ethnic groups in China. Homoglyphs or homonyms were often used when referring to
the CPC (共产党) (e.g., “哄铲挡”, hǒng chǎn dǎng) and Falun Gong (e.g., “發圇”,
pronounced fā lún, as opposed to 法轮功, fǎ lún gōng).
We also found keywords in Korean and Japanese related to international relations
issues in Asia. Examples include “일진회”, which refers to Iljinhoe, a nationwide
pro-Japan organization that operated in Korea in the 1900s. The presence of these
keywords may be because some games we analyzed were imported from foreign gaming companies or were aimed at foreign markets. It may also have to do with the
unique characteristics of gaming platforms where in-group identity and nationalism
is often shared and championed by players [5, 109].
People: Similar to our work in the previous two chapters, we found references
to people including government officials, relatives of officials, dissidents, and names
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without clear context. Keywords included use of homonyms, homoglyphs, coded
messages, and pinyin to refer to party leaders and dissidents. For example, “刁净瓶”
contains a homoglyph (刁) and a homonym (净瓶, jìngpíng) for President Xi Jinping
(习近平, xí jìnpíng). In another example a coded reference is made to China’s first
Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo who received the award in absentia due to
imprisonment (“无法领奖的人”, a person who is unable to receive the award).
Event: Our work in the previous two chapters showed evidence that sensitive
and critical events can act as catalysts for censorship of social media in China. We
tested the prevalence of event-related keywords by searching for terms related to
current events that occurred within 2016 to 2017 and that had been found censored
on Chinese chat applications in recent studies [115, 63, 116] or that were known to
have leaked government censorship directives [54]. We did not find references to
these up-to-date news events in the gaming keyword data set. However, we did find
keywords referring to other politically sensitive events (e.g., “1989年民运”, or 1989
Year Democracy Movement, a reference to the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement;
“茉莉花活动”, and the Jasmine Revolution, a reference to a series of pro-democracy
protests in China inspired by the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia in 2011).
Chat apps and microblogs provide means to communicate and spread content,
whereas games are primarily for entertainment. Therefore, there may be increased
concern and scrutiny of how apps used for news consumption manage content related
to current events. It is also possible there are references to events we did not find
due to the limitation of the scope of our current project. In our analysis we did not
analyze historical versions of each mobile game, and we did not track any downloaded
updates, if there were any, to its keyword lists.
Technology: This theme includes references to identifiers such as phone numbers
and emails. This theme also includes names of websites and various technology
services including censorship evasion tools.
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Keywords also included references to the names of competing game companies.
For example, the keyword lists for Fishing Joy 4 (捕鱼达人4), a casual game developed and published by Chukong Technologies, includes references to games developed
by competitors (e.g., “侠客天下”, an online game developed by Beijing Xiakehang
Network Technology Limited Company; “仙境传说”, a reference to Ragnarok Online, a Korean MMORPG). In the previous chapter, analysis of censored keyword
lists from Chinese live streaming apps also found references to the names of competing products, possibly to prevent users from being lured away to other platforms.
The names of competitors present on the game keyword lists may be motivated by
similar reasons.

5.5

Summary

In earlier chapters we analyzed companies’ instant messaging and live streaming
apps to determine whether these companies were receiving common directives from
the central Chinese government that were largely influencing what they censor. Our
findings were that this was not the case.
In this chapter, we analyzed censorship in mobile games, finding over 250 keyword lists in over 200 games. This large number of lists allowed us to examine other
hypotheses related to Chinese censorship, namely that city or provincial authorities,
not ones from the central government, play a large role in determining what companies censor. However, we found no significant correlation between the similarity
of two games’ lists and whether those games had publishers or developers from the
same city or province. We found that only whether two games shared the same
developer or publisher correlated with the similarity of those games’ keyword lists.
This suggests that the responsibility to choose what to censor is pushed down to
individual companies or employees.
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Conclusion and Future Work
The work in this dissertation takes a departure from other work in the field by
not using sample testing to measure censorship. Many studies employing sample
testing choose words from a list of potential words composed by a researcher. The
censorship results are biased toward whatever the researcher presupposed could be
censored. Others measure content deletion on platforms. These studies are biased
toward whatever was trending or popular on the platform during the study and do
not reveal forbidden topics that were never discussed or that were never discussed
publicly.
Instead of using sample testing, the work in this dissertation uses reverse engineering to determine the entire list of forbidden keywords used to filter realtime
chat. This work analyzes over 100,000 keywords from hundreds of different companies across three different industry segments: instant messaging, live streaming, and
gaming.
At the beginning of this dissertation, I introduced three hypotheses to be evaluated by the more complete and unbiased dataset provided by this work. The first
hypothesis is that there is little overlap between the keyword lists used by
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different companies. Our analysis of censorship in Chinese instant messaging
apps and live streaming apps revealed that there was little overlap between apps’
lists from different companies. The only seeming exception was the commonalities
between GuaGua’s and Sina’s lists. This exception disappeared when we discovered
that GuaGua was founded by former Sina employees. When over time we looked at
what high level topics or events these lists were updated in response to, we again
found little overlap. Our analysis of gaming apps also showed little overlap between
lists except for what could only be explained by companies sharing the same lists.
Therefore, the data we collected in all three of these industry segments strongly
supports Hypothesis 1.
The second hypothesis is that there is no China-wide list of banned words
or topics largely determining what Chinese companies censor. The data
in this dissertation strongly supports this hypothesis for largely similar reasons. If
there is little overlap between lists, then then there cannot be a China-wide list
determining most of what companies censor. If there were such a list largely determining what companies censor, then there would necessarily be a large amount of
overlap between lists. Therefore, the data collected in this dissertation also strongly
supports Hypothesis 2.
The third hypothesis is that provincial-wide lists of banned words or topics
do not largely determine what companies censor. Our analysis of censorship
in mobile games supports this hypothesis. We saw little overlap between blacklists
in this dataset. Because of the large number of blacklists from different companies
in this dataset, we were able to test a number of other hypotheses to explain what
overlap we did observe. Whether the blacklists’ game publishers or developers were
from the same province did not explain lists’ overlap. We could not transfer this
analysis to the instant messaging and live streaming datasets because they do not
contain as many blacklists from as many companies. This makes the support for
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Hypothesis 3 not as strong as the others. However, if the lesson from all three datasets
is to not overestimate the role of the central government in choosing what topics
are forbidden, then we should be careful not to overestimate the role of provincial
governments as well.
A dominant academic theory developed by King et al. [89, 90] from studying
blog providers asserts that the motive of Chinese censorship is to suppress collective
action. This theory implicitly assumes a monolithic motive. One way of reconciling
this theory with the results in this dissertation is to argue that the theory was
developed by studying blog providers, a different industry segment than the three
analyzed in this dissertation and which might be censored according to substantially
different regulations. However, since the King et al. work used sample testing, a
more biased method than the one used in this dissertation, this more likely explains
the discrepant findings. This is especially true since another, earlier work [98] also
studying blog providers but also using sample testing found little consistency in the
topics forbidden by different blog providers. The two different results from sample
testing underscores the need for a complete and unbiased view into which topics are
forbidden.
The findings presented in this dissertation parallel Link’s notion of the “anaconda
in the chandelier” [97], which he uses as a metaphor to describe how the Chinese
censorship apparatus puts pressure on individuals to self-censor in order to avoid
being punished for violating vague laws. He says that the anaconda’s “constant
silent message is ‘You yourself decide,’ after which, more often than not, everyone in
its shadow makes his or her large and small adjustments.” Although this metaphor
was originally used to describe how individuals self-censor themselves, the work in
this dissertation shows that this metaphor is equally appropriate in explaining how
private companies censor their own platforms.
China could conceivably provide an exhaustive list of blacklisted topics to ev-

105

Chapter 6. Conclusion and Future Work
ery private company leaving no question what to censor; however, Link’s anaconda
metaphor provides insight into why they do not. First, by keeping censorship requirements intentionally vague, the Chinese government maintains plausible deniability
so that if something a company censors generates backlash, the blame ultimately falls
on the company for choosing to censor it and not the Chinese government. Second,
in order to avoid penalties, private companies may censor more content than what
would appear on a government-provided blacklist as companies are left to try and
guess everything that they must censor, inevitably in the process censoring extra
things that would not have been on a government-provided blacklist.
Future Chinese censorship researchers should be cautious before presuming a
monolithic motive behind Chinese censorship. The Chinese censorship apparatus
has a significant effect on controlling what information hundreds of millions of people
in China have access to; however, not all significant effects have significant causes,
and the work in this dissertation suggests that the reason for why something is
censored in a Chinese application may be an arbitrary decision by a private company
or one of its employees to protect the company from vague laws. Additionally, as
our research finds, companies also use censorship for their own motivations such
as to censor competitors. Future researchers would better understand censorship in
China by studying the motivations and incentives of private companies who are given
little direction in deciding what to censor and are largely deciding what to censor
themselves.

6.1 Future work
The work in this dissertation paves the way for future research into Chinese censorship in multiple directions. Our method of extracting complete keyword blacklists
has revealed little overlap between lists from different companies, suggesting that
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companies are given a large amount of freedom in choosing what to censor. However, there is a small fraction of keywords that appear on most lists. Are these
keywords on so many lists because they are well known to be sensitive? Has developers sharing lists, especially early when the first blacklists were being developed,
contributed to the number of keywords appearing on a large number of lists? Was
there ever a blacklist, no matter how small, provided by the Chinese government to
a large amount of Internet companies? These questions are difficult to answer given
our current dataset, but one possible future reasearch direction of research is to investigate words that frequently appear together on lists. If words typically appear
together with other words across many different lists, then this suggests that they
may have originated from an earlier, common list that was shared.
We manually categorized keywords from instant messaging and live streaming
apps according to their high-level theme, but we did not do this with the Chinese
games dataset due to its large size, instead only sampling and categorizing a fraction
of the keywords. Another avenue for future research is to complete keyword categorization of the Chinese games keyword dataset through manual or machine learning
assisted methods. This would permit the cross-comparison of lists from this dataset
in a high level thematic sense. Although doing this with the instant messaging and
live streaming datasets revealed little thematic overlap, it would permit us to verify
our previous findings with the new data in the Chinese gaming dataset.
The Chinese gaming dataset also presents an opportunity to measure a “ground
truth” regarding how private companies in China choose what to censor. The gaming
dataset differs from the previous instant messaging and live streaming datasets we
analyzed in that it contains hundreds of different publishers and developers and in
that a large number of them are not based in China. Many of these companies may
be willing to be interviewed regarding the requirements of developing and publishing
a game for the Chinese market. These second-hand accounts could provide further
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insight into how private Chinese companies choose to implement censorship.
It remains an open question as to what extent censorship in China mirrors how
other countries’ censorship ecosystems will develop. As the largest country in the
world, China’s implementation represents a large data point. However, China is
currently unique among other countries in how it has fostered its own ecosystem of
domestic Internet apps, often by using Internet-level censorship to block foreign Internet companies competing against domestic alternatives. Nevertheless, other countries such as Russia are also increasingly exerting their “Internet sovereignty” [100],
blocking foreign companies for failing to adhere to local laws [130], and becoming
increasingly reliant on private companies to police their users’ communication in accordance with those countries’ local regulations [95]. As countries other than China
continue to increasingly exert control over their users’ Internet and foster their own
local ecosystems of applications, will we see them adopting a decentralized approach
leaving private companies to determine exactly what to censor? While decentralizing
censorship may at first seem suboptimal, Link’s anaconda in the chandelier analogy
provides insight into why this may be the most advantageous approach and why
other countries may be clever to embrace it.
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